Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States

Hanson, Gordon H.

doi:10.3386/w12141

Cited by 115 publications

(158 citation statements)

References 91 publications

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“…In the policy debate, the control of migration flows carried out at the border is often considered to be less effective than work-site inspections, because effectively patrolling a vast border with its huge number of potential entry points is more costly than effectively checking the working sites where undocumented immigrants are likely to be employed (Hanson 2006). 14 Hence, we will call our second instrument border enforcement.…”

Section: Border Vs Domestic Enforcementmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The migration policy enforcement priorities pursued by U.S. agencies have led several observers to conclude that the ineffective use of resources is driven by political constraints (Cornelius et al 2004, Hanson 2006, Massey et al 2002 and importantly, the experience of the United States is shared by many other countries. For example, Italy has recently implemented tighter border controls, even if this is unlikely to have the desired effects.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Political Economy of Migration Enforcement: Domestic Versus Border Control

Facchini

Testa

2014

SSRN Journal

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We study migration policy enforcement by an elected government. The policy-maker faces uncertainty on the supply of migrants, but has more information than the public on its preferences and the extent and effectiveness of its enforcement activities. We show that a utilitarian government preferring more migrants than the majority may find it optimal to set a restrictive target to please the median voter, while relaxing its enforcement to admit more foreigners in a concealed way. Lax enforcement may be achieved either by deploying inadequate resources on cost-effective activities (domestic enforcement) or by allocating a larger budget on less effective tools (border enforcement). The attractiveness of one instrument over the other depends on the size of the immigrant flow: if the supply is large, border enforcement might be preferred because, although more costly, it brings the number of migrants closer to the utilitarian optimum. Hence, re-election concerns might provide a rationale for the widespread use of less a effective enforcement tool, such as border control.JEL classification: F22, J61.

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Section: Border Vs Domestic Enforcementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Political Economy of Migration Enforcement: Domestic Versus Border Control

Facchini

Testa

2014

SSRN Journal

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“…The most common method used to estimate the number of unauthorized immigrants is the residual approach, or merely calculating the difference between the total measured foreignborn population and the legal immigrant population (see Hanson 2006). According to the latest figures, there are 11.2 million unauthorized immigrants living in the U.S. as of March 2010 (Passel and Cohn 2011).…”

Section: B Identifying Unauthorized Immigrantsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Wage Impact of Undocumented Workers

2012

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in www.econstor.euThe paper has benefited from comments and suggestions from George Borjas, J. David Brown, Curtis Florence, Jerry Gonzalez, Gordon Hanson, Robert E. Moore, Pia Orrenius, Giovanni Peri, Debra Sabia, Eric Seiber, Chad Sparber, Madeline Zavodny, and seminar participants at the Departments of Economics at the Georgia Institute of Technology, the University of Kentucky, the University of Georgia Department of Public Administration and Policy, Claremont-McKenna College, and the University of California-Riverside. The research assistance of Gustavo Canavire, M. Laurel Graefe, Gustavo Uceda, and Eric Wang is much appreciated. The views expressed here are the authors' and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta or the Federal Reserve System. Any remaining errors are the authors' responsibility. Abstract: Using administrative, individual-level, longitudinal data from the state of Georgia, this paper finds that a documented worker employed by a firm that hires undocumented workers can expect to earn 0.15 percent less than if employed by a firm that does not hire undocumented workers. However, in sectors where there are opportunities for task specialization and benefits from communication skills, documented workers can expect to earn a wage premium of less than 1 percent from being employed at a firm that also hires undocumented workers.JEL classification: J30, J15

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“…Following his survey and analysis of the motivations for unauthorized immigrants from Mexico to the U.S., Hanson (2006) reaches the more general conclusion that it is income differences between source and destination countries that are directly correlated with immigrant flows. He also concludes that:…”

Section: The Supply and Demand For Unauthorized Workersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unauthorized Immigration

Bodvarsson¹,

Berg²

2013

The Economics of Immigration

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One of the results of the clash between immigration policies and economic incentives is unauthorized immigration. There is no accurate data on unauthorized immigration, but estimates permit some empirical work. The motives for immigrants to enter the destination country without formal authorization are the same as those that lead immigrants to seek legal entry, and the static labor market model of immigration can be used to explain the flows of unauthorized immigrants. There are additional factors to consider, however. Unauthorized immigrants do not normally enjoy the same civil rights as legal immigrants, so the potential rewards from immigrating are unlikely to be the same for legal and unauthorized immigrants. There are other interesting questions, such as why so many destination countries implicitly accept substantial numbers of unauthorized immigrants, even though their formal laws and regulations call for their strict punishment and expulsion. Unfortunately, we have few answers.If the migrants run into some new … wall, they will simply go around it. Or over it. Or under it. Mexicans will show as much ingenuity in getting into the United States as Americans would in breaking into British Columbia if the Canadian minimum wage were $70 an hour. 1

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Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States

Cited by 115 publications

References 91 publications

The Political Economy of Migration Enforcement: Domestic Versus Border Control

The Political Economy of Migration Enforcement: Domestic Versus Border Control

The Wage Impact of Undocumented Workers

Unauthorized Immigration

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