Illusory Implications: Mere exposure to ideas can induce beliefs

Abstract

Numerous psychological findings have shown that mere exposure to ideas makes those ideas seem more true, a finding commonly referred to as the “illusory truth” effect (e.g. Hasher, Goldstein, & Toppino, 1977). In the presence of pervasive misinformation, this basic feature of cognition may undermine the functioning of a democratic society (Pennycook, Cannon, & Rand, 2018). However, genuine beliefs do not only affect judgments about individual statements, they also imply other beliefs and drive decision-making. Here, we sought to examine whether mere exposure to statements produces genuine beliefs by examining whether people draw inferences from statements after mere exposure. Surprisingly, and in contrast to fluency or familiarity-based accounts of the illusory truth effect (e.g. Dechêne, Stahl, Hansen, & Wänke, 2010), we found that exposure to “premise” statements affected participants’ truth ratings for novel “implied” statements. This “illusory implication” effect suggests that the consequences of exposure to false statements reach further than previously thought and calls for a new mechanistic account of these effects.