Impact of Using Extension Services of Organic Fertilizers for Carbon Sequestration in China: Evolutionary Game Analysis on Local Governments and Farmers' Behavioral Strategies

Abstract

The application of organic fertilizers plays a crucial role in achieving carbon sequestration in the agricultural sector. This paper discusses how farmers can more smoothly promote organic fertilizer extension services. An evolutionary game model is developed to describe the conflicting interests of Chinese farmers and local governments in organic fertilizer extension services, and the dynamic evolution of the game players and the influence of parameter adjustment on the strategic choices of both parties is presented. In this paper, the game model and the main results are validated with the help of simulation tools, and a sensitivity analysis of the selected parameters is performed. The results show that (1) the implementation of subsidy policy is less helpful for organic fertilizer extension services; (2) The ideal event probability of the game was found to be positively related to the cost of applying inorganic fertilizers, additional benefits to farmers, political returns to local governments, and penalties for not using organic fertilizers; (3) This is important for improving the performance of local governments, reducing government regulatory costs, improving policy support for organic fertilizer extension services, and reducing the cost of implementing organic fertilizer extension services.