In Defence of ‘Partially Clad’ Bare Particulars

Pickavance, Timothy H.

doi:10.1080/00048400802215570

Cited by 26 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…5 Indeed, supporters of BPs openly claim that their theory does not entail belief in bare identities and extreme haecceitism; and, to do so, they give up the abovementioned assumption about bare particulars as the sole source of identity of concrete particulars. Pickavance (2009), for instance, argues that, although all concrete particulars are individuated by their BPs, their identity is only determined by the whole constituted by those BPs together with at least some properties, tied to those specific BPs during a specific interval of time, and essential for the corresponding concrete particular.…”

Section: Bps and Empirical Properties: Do Substrata Need More Than MImentioning

confidence: 98%

“…Here, particularity and unrepeatability will be regarded as one and the same thing. 4 As argued byPickavance (2009), that denoted by the predicate 'is constituent-dependent on…' is also to be considered as a relation that is not metaphysically genuine. (Pickavance points this out explicitly with the aim of answering an objection formulated byDavis (Davis (2003; 541-547)).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Substrata and Properties: From Bare Particulars to Supersubstantivalism?

Morganti¹

2011

Int Ontology Metaphysics

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The theory of the ontological constitution of material objects based on bare particulars has recently experienced a revival, especially thanks to the work of J.P. Moreland. Moreland and other authors belonging to this 'new wave', however, have focused primarily on the issue whether or not the notion of a 'bare' particular is internally consistent. Not much has been said, instead, about the relation holding between bare particulars and the properties they are supposed to unify into concrete particulars. This paper aims to fill this gap and, making reference primarily to Moreland's version of the theory, highlight some aspects and consequences of it that have not received due attention so far. It is argued that, given a number of seemingly plausible metaphysical assumptions, supporters of bare particulars are led to either endorse supersubstantivalism-the view that material objects are identical with regions of space-time-or abandon their theory altogether. Whatever one makes of the proposed conclusion, a dialectical structure emerges that puts precise constraints on bare particular ontologies and, therefore, will have to be taken into account in future discussion of these and related topics.

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Section: Bps and Empirical Properties: Do Substrata Need More Than MImentioning

confidence: 98%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Substrata and Properties: From Bare Particulars to Supersubstantivalism?

Morganti¹

2011

Int Ontology Metaphysics

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“…3 See for example Moreland (1998); Pickavance (2014); Perović (2017). Also, other functions of bare particulars include: being able to individuate objects, and being able to unify the properties of objects.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pure Universals: Total and Partial

Aguisoul

2022

Journal of Human Cognition

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The bundle theory under a realist constituent ontology takes material objects to be composed of repeatable qualitative parts. This theory must answer the problem of individuation, the problem of explaining how two or more qualitatively undistinguishable objects are numerically distinct. Any answer however is conditioned by the regulation that one should invoke only pure universals, i. e., constitutive qualitative parts like being yellow. An answer which appeals to impure universals, i. e., nonconstitutive qualitative parts like being Aristotle or being from Greece, is a transgression. Here I attempt to show that positing individual essences like being Aristotle as individuators is no transgression. For one, they are constitutive qualitative parts, because they are constitutive qualitative improper parts, as opposed to constitutive qualitative proper parts like being yellow; for two, they are universals, because they are capable of a kind of multiple location I call multiple fictional location.

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“…But it has had its share of prominent defenders:Alston (1954),Armstrong (1989Armstrong ( , 1997,Russell (1948), and recently,Sider (2006). Other defenses include:Allaire (1963Allaire ( , 1965, Baker (1967),Bergmann (1947Bergmann ( , 1964Bergmann ( , 1967,Casullo (1982),Davis and Brown (2008),Magelhaes (2007),Martin (1980),Moreland (1998Moreland ( , 2001,Moreland and Pickavance (2003),Oaklander and Rothstein (2000), andPickavance (2009). For critical treatment, see citations in note5 and Chappell (1964),Davis (2003), andMertz (2001Mertz ( , 2003.…”

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confidence: 95%

No bare particulars

Bailey

2010

Philos Stud

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There are predicates and subjects. It is thus tempting to think that there are properties on the one hand, and things that have them on the other. I have no quarrel with this thought; it is a fine place to begin a theory of properties and property-having. But in this paper, I argue that one such theory-bare particularism-is false. I pose a dilemma. Either bare particulars instantiate the properties of their host substances or they do not. If they do not, then bare particularism is both unmotivated and false. If they do, then the view faces a problematic-and, I shall argue, false-crowding consequence.

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In Defence of ‘Partially Clad’ Bare Particulars

Cited by 26 publications

References 3 publications

Substrata and Properties: From Bare Particulars to Supersubstantivalism?

Substrata and Properties: From Bare Particulars to Supersubstantivalism?

Pure Universals: Total and Partial

No bare particulars

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