In-group we trust, no more? How senders’ legitimacy shapes the success of sanctions-based democracy promotion

Abstract

For decades, pro-democracy states and organizations have been using coercive measures such as sanctions to promote and uphold democratic governance worldwide, yet not always successfully. Recent research has improved our knowledge on such ‘democracy sanctions’, but our understanding of how the different identities of sanctioners shape their success is not complete yet. Focusing on Africa, one of the biggest recipients of such measures but also a primary sender of them especially through the African Union, this article aims to systematically compare how the sanctioning behaviour of regional and extra-regional actors has impacted on the democratic status of the continent since the 1990s. The empirical analysis reconsiders the comparative advantage of regional actors’ legitimacy to explain the likelihood of democracy sanctions success. It shows that ‘in-group’ democracy sanctions in which regional organizations are involved have bigger chances of success than those imposed by higher-capacity yet less-legitimate extra-regional actors only. However, it also shows in-group legitimacy can erode and that cooperation with such local organizations can help contain global democratic erosion, but hardly achieve democratic deepening, due to soft, face-saving compliance criteria and different understandings democracy and its promotion have across the world.