Abstract:Summary .The knowledge account of assertion (KAA) is the view that assertion is governed by the norm that the speaker should know what s/he asserts. It is not the purpose of this article to examine all these criticisms nor to try to give a full defence of KAA, but only to defend it against the charge of being normatively incorrect It has been objected that assertion is governed by other norms than knowledge, or by no norm at all. It seems to me, however, that a number of these criticisms are based on a number … Show more
“…• KNOWLEDGE-RULE: "Assert p only if you know that p" (DeRose, 2002;Engel, 2008;Hawthorne, 2004;Reynolds, 2002;Williamson, 1996) • TRUTH-RULE: "Assert p only if p is true" (Alston, 2000;MacFarlane, 2014;Weiner, 2005;Whiting, 2012) • 'JUSTIFICATION-RULE': "Assert p only if you rationally believe that p" (or "only if it is rational for you to believe that p") (Douven, 2006;Gerken, 2012Gerken, , 2017Kvanvig, 2009;Lackey, 2007;McKinnon, 2012McKinnon, , 2013 • BELIEF-RULE': "Assert p only if you believe that p" (Bach, 2008;Hindriks, 2007) .…”
Section: Competing Accounts Of the Norm Of Assertionmentioning
Assertions are our standard communicative tool for sharing and acquiring information. Recent empirical studies seemingly provide converging evidence that assertions are subject to a factive norm: you are entitled to assert a proposition p only if p is true. All these studies, however, assume that we can treat participants' judgments about what an agent 'should say' as evidence of their intuitions about assertability. This paper argues that this assumption is incorrect, so that the conclusions drawn in these studies are unwarranted. It shows that most people do not interpret statements about what an agent 'should say' as statements about assertability, but rather as statements about what is in the agent's interest to do. It identifies some effective measures to force the intended reading of statements about what an agent 'should say', and shows that when these measures are implemented, people's judgments consistently and overwhelmingly align with non-factive accounts of assertion.
“…• KNOWLEDGE-RULE: "Assert p only if you know that p" (DeRose, 2002;Engel, 2008;Hawthorne, 2004;Reynolds, 2002;Williamson, 1996) • TRUTH-RULE: "Assert p only if p is true" (Alston, 2000;MacFarlane, 2014;Weiner, 2005;Whiting, 2012) • 'JUSTIFICATION-RULE': "Assert p only if you rationally believe that p" (or "only if it is rational for you to believe that p") (Douven, 2006;Gerken, 2012Gerken, , 2017Kvanvig, 2009;Lackey, 2007;McKinnon, 2012McKinnon, , 2013 • BELIEF-RULE': "Assert p only if you believe that p" (Bach, 2008;Hindriks, 2007) .…”
Section: Competing Accounts Of the Norm Of Assertionmentioning
Assertions are our standard communicative tool for sharing and acquiring information. Recent empirical studies seemingly provide converging evidence that assertions are subject to a factive norm: you are entitled to assert a proposition p only if p is true. All these studies, however, assume that we can treat participants' judgments about what an agent 'should say' as evidence of their intuitions about assertability. This paper argues that this assumption is incorrect, so that the conclusions drawn in these studies are unwarranted. It shows that most people do not interpret statements about what an agent 'should say' as statements about assertability, but rather as statements about what is in the agent's interest to do. It identifies some effective measures to force the intended reading of statements about what an agent 'should say', and shows that when these measures are implemented, people's judgments consistently and overwhelmingly align with non-factive accounts of assertion.
“…Over and above Williamson himself, the knowledge norm has been favored, in a number of variants, by among others Keith DeRose (), Steven Reynolds (), Jonathan Adler (, p. 275, John Hawthorne (), Jason Stanley (), Pascal Engel (), Jonathan Schaffer (), and John Turri ().…”
Section: The Variety Of Normsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This makes it difficult to attack the the knowledge account by means of intuitive counterexamples. Kvanvig (, p. 235) and Engel (, p. 52–4) have drawn attention to this situation. Kvanvig writes The problem for the counter‐example approach here is that defenders of the knowledge account have a wealth of resources to explain away the counter‐examples in a way consistent with the knowledge account (Kvanvig , p. 235).…”
Section: Problems With Intuitive Supportmentioning
In this paper I draw attention to a number of problems that afflict norm accounts of assertion, i.e. accounts that explain what assertion is, and typically how speakers understand what assertion is, by appeal to a norm of assertion. I argue that the disagreements in the literature over norm selection undermines such an account of understanding. I also argue that the treatment of intuitions as evidence in the literature undermines much of the connection to empirical evidence. I further argue that appeals made to conversational patterns do not require the existence of any norms at all.
“…They merely show that it can be overridden by other norms not specific to assertion. The other norms do not give me warrant to assert p, for to have such warrant is to satisfy the rule of assertion" (Williamson 2000, p. 256), cited also in Engel (2008), my italics.…”
Section: Uniqueness and Sufficiencymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…', Engel (2008) begins by noting three components that, taken together, constitute the Knowledge Account of Assertion:…”
This paper has two central aims. First, we motivate a puzzle. The puzzle features four independently plausible but jointly inconsistent claims. One of the four claims is the sufficiency leg of the knowledge norm of assertion (KNA-S), according to which one is properly epistemically positioned to assert that p if one knows that p. Second, we propose that rejecting (KNA-S) is the best way out of the puzzle. Our argument to this end appeals to the epistemic value of intellectual humility in social-epistemic practice.
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