Incentives for promoting climate change adaptation technologies in agriculture: An evolutionary game approach

Abstract

Climate change adaptation technologies (CCATs) have become an important tool for farmers to cope with climate change and address the risks of natural disasters, but in many rural areas, there is still a reliance on traditional agricultural techniques. It is necessary to explore the incentives for promoting CCATs in agriculture, and the conditions for the effectiveness and realization of policy measures. In this paper, we construct an evolutionary game model to analyze the behaviour of local governments and farmers in promoting CCATs. Our findings are as follows: Under certain conditions, the evolutionary game of promoting CCATs in agriculture can achieve equilibrium. Within a certain range, the incentive for farmers to choose to adopt CCATs increases with local governments’ risk subsidy and cost-sharing. When the subsidy is too high, local governments may choose the no- promotion strategy, under which the policy incentive disappears, reducing the incentive for farmers to adopt CCATs. Publicity is an important incentive for promoting CCATs, and its effect is evident. Our findings provide insights into the development of policies to promote CCATs in agriculture.

Research on Industrial Collaborative Incentive Mechanism Based on Evolutionary Game in Digital Background

“…Based on Friedman's method, the local stability of Jacobian matrix and interest matrix can be used to verify whether the strategy organization formed by both parties in the game is a stable strategy, that is, whether it is ESS, and analyze which factors will affect the strategy selection of both parties [10] . See table 1 for the specific analysis results.…”