Inefficiencies in the National Hockey League Points System and the Teams That Take Advantage

Abstract

In the current National Hockey League (NHL) points system (PS), there are increased incentives for teams to play overtime games against nonconference opponents. We use empirical data across three recent NHL PSs to test if and when teams have responded to these incentives. We find that in the current PS, several teams are playing a significantly higher proportion of overtime games against nonconference opponents than within-conference ones, and that overtime games are also significantly more likely to occur in the months leading up to postseason play.

Assessing the causal impact of the 3-point per victory scoring system in the competitive balance of LaLiga

“…In a previous work, Sánchez, Garcia-Calvo, Leo, Pollard, and Gómez (2009) show that the inclusion of the 3-point system reduced the home advantage of teams in LaLiga and the Spanish second division, as happened previously in the Premier League (Jacklin, 2005). However, unlike other related works in the literature that deal with the issue of analysing competitive balance without taking into account the different substructures and levels of performance of teams (Cardoso Marques, 2009;Easton & Rockerbie, 2005;Lopez, 2015), this paper aims to assess such differences by measuring the impact of a concrete phenomenon on it. Precisely, our analysis considers that identifying the competitive specificities of the teams according to their performance levels is essential to reveal the real competitiveness of the league as a whole.…”

How often does the best team win? A unified approach to understanding randomness in North American sport

“…For example, there are seven NHL team-seasons in which at least one team reached an average posterior strength estimate of 0.55 or greater; each of these came during or prior to the 2008-09 season. In addition to increased parity, the league's point system change in 2005-06-which unintentionally encouraged teams to play more overtime games (Lopez, 2013)-could be responsible. More overtime contests imsart-aoas ver.…”

Wage Disparity, Team Performance, and the 2005 NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement

“…This suggests that defensive units require more team cohesiveness perhaps because they must play together as a collective unit more so than offensive units. The post‐CBA period corresponds with a statistically significant increase in team performance points, as reflected in the positive and statistically significant parameter on the CBA indicator variable, perhaps because of the increased incentive to play for a tie at the end of regulation as pointed out by Lopez (, ). The post‐CBA period corresponded with an increase in both goals scored and goals allowed…”

“…Because a game that ends in regulation distributes two points between the two teams but in a winner‐take‐all fashion, in a close game both teams have an incentive to play for a tie in regulation so that there are three points distributed between the two teams. This incentive has led to more overtime matches (if not necessarily more shootouts) and an artificial increase in the number of performance points awarded to teams after the CBA was enacted (Lopez , ).…”