2009
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0106.2009.00442.x
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Influencing the Public and Efficiency in Bureaucratic Provision

Abstract: In the present paper a public bureau can extract additional budgetary allocations, not only by misreporting its production cost to its oversight committee but also by 'influencing' the perceptions of the public at large. I juxtapose the bureau's ability to influence the public with its ability to misreport to the oversight committee, and find that influencing the public might support an efficient level of production by invoking a separating equilibrium. However, a pooling equilibrium involving either overprodu… Show more

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