Informal Institutions and Democracy

Lauth, Hans‐Joachim

doi:10.1080/13510340008403683

Cited by 395 publications

(174 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…The performance of formal institutions is crucially shaped and influenced by informal structures in an important and partially unpredictable way: however, there have been some attempts to unravel this connection (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004;Lauth, 2000).…”

Section: Theoretical Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Helmke and Levitsky (2004) expand the work of Lauth (2000), who distinguishes between three types of formal-informal institutional relationships (complementary, substitutive and conflicting) but neglects to go into further detail. further elaborates on the aspect of strength for the abovementioned informal ties (social capital) and their respective influence on formal institutions.…”

Section: A Typology Of Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This kind of informal institution fills gaps, takes care of issues the formal institutions neglect to deal with and thus enhances their efficiency (Lauth, 2000).…”

Section: A Typology Of Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Dynamic Typology of Informal Institutions: Learning from the Case ofGuanxi

Horak

Restel

2016

Manag. Organ. Rev.

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Currently, the mechanism in which informal institutions, recently discovered as an influential, new paradigm in business and management studies interact with and shape formal institutions remains unclear. Helmke and Levitsky (2004) proposed an outcome-based typology for the interaction of informal institutions with formal ones. By using a structured approach for literature aggregation, we test the proposed typology of Helmke and Levitsky by applying this method to 74 empirical studies to investigate the influence of guanxi on formal institutions. We conclude that guanxi fits into none of the proposed categories perfectly. As a result, we propose the relationship between guanxi and formal institutions as auxiliary as well as competing concurrently, leading to convergent and divergent outcomes, respectively. Moreover, we propose a third category to add to the existing typology, namely 'formal institutions in transition'. We furthermore incorporate a dynamic aspect to the model by adding two further categories, concerned with the direction of the development. We believe the resulting extension to the original typology of Helmke and Levitsky accurately accounts for the dynamic nature of informal institutions as well as their important role in shaping effective formal institutions.

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Section: Theoretical Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Typology Of Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Dynamic Typology of Informal Institutions: Learning from the Case ofGuanxi

Horak

Restel

2016

Manag. Organ. Rev.

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“…Pero los partidos varían bastante en lo que concierne al peso relativo de organización formal e informal dentro de su estructura" (Freidenberg y Levitsky, 2007, p. 543). 9 Para mayor información sobre partidos políticos, política informal e instituciones informales véanse Lauth (2000), Levitsky (2001), Auyero (2001), Helmke y Levitsky (2003) y Freidenberg y Levitsky (2007). 10 La institucionalización es "el proceso por el cual adquieren valor y estabilidad las organizaciones y procedimientos" (Huntington, 1991, p. 23).…”

Section: La Estrategia Organizativa De Alianza Pais: Los Comités De Lunclassified

Las Organizaciones De Base De Alianza Pais: El Papel De Los Comités De La Revolución Ciudadana en La Movilización Política

Llive

2017

Anal. político

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análisis político nº 91, Bogotá, septiembre-diciembre, 2017: págs. 96-109[96] RESUMENEl presente trabajo describe la conformación y funcionamiento de los comités de la revolución ciudadana, con el objetivo de entender las redes clientelares que sostienen al gobierno de Alianza PAIS. El pedido para constituirlos en cada hogar, en cada cuadra, en cada comunidad, lo hizo Rafael Correa al iniciar su segundo mandato y fue presentado como parte de una estrategia de radicalización revolucionaria gubernamental. La investigación es de tipo descriptivo, con diseño no experimental, documental, empleando fuentes de información primaria y secundaria. Los resultados revelan que las experiencias reales sobre su construcción son insignificantes, que se falsearon las estadísticas sobre su crecimiento y que se debieron recurrir a caciques y punteros locales para cumplir con la demanda presidencial.Palabras clave: Ecuador, Alianza PAIS, clientelismo, comités de la revolución ciudadana, Rafael Correa. PAIS ALLIANCE'S GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS: THE POLITICAL MOBILIZATION ROLE OF THE CITIZENS' REVOLUTION COMMIT TEES ABSTRACTThis paper describes the configuration and operation of Ecuador's Citizens' Revolution Committees with the objective of explaining how patronage networks underlie the PAIS Alliance government. The call for their establishment in every household, every block, and every community was made by President Rafael Correa at the initiation of his second term, presented as part of a revolutionary government radicalization strategy. Related research is of a descriptive, non-experimental, documentary nature utilizing primary and secondary sources of information and discloses that the reality underlying their organizational experiences is insignificant with statistics pertaining to their evolution falsified and resort to local political bosses and intermediaries to comply with the presidential demand.

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“…It is in the inability of the formal structure to fulfil the demand for stability, protection and predictability we might find an explanation for the increasing demand for informal practices. Furthermore, "informal practices" (Ledeneva 2006), "custom codes" (Lauth 2000) or "etiquette" (Guo Xinghua 2008:25) prevail in legal systems where public (and private) actors are "above the law" -in the literature described as "rule of men" (Guo Xinghua 2008:9) or "states ruled by law" (Kahn 2002:55) -contrary to public management systems based on the principle of the "Rule of law". 7 One specific example of contemporary informal practices in Russia -the selective enforcement of the formal rules where regulations and/or sanctions are manipulated to secure favorable outcomes for insiders -will be discussed in more detail in the next section.…”

Section: Nordlit 39 2017mentioning

confidence: 99%