Institutional Accountability of Nonstate Actors in the UNFCCC: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty

Abstract

How are nonstate actors within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) held to account? In this article, we introduce the concept of “institutional accountability” to complement the wider literature(s) on accountability in climate governance. Within institutional frameworks, actors employ rules, norms, and procedures to demand justifications from one another. In light of those justifications, actors then use “exit, voice, or loyalty” to positively or negatively sanction each other. To depict the dynamics of institutional accountability, we analyze the role of nonstate actors in the nine constituency groups of the UNFCCC. We outline the constituency structure and the population of observer organizations. We then identify examples where nonstate actors employed institutional rules in tandem with exit, voice, or loyalty to foster accountability. In making this analysis we draw upon three years of on-site participation at UNFCCC meetings, document analysis, and more than 40 semi-structured interviews with state and nonstate actors. We conclude by discussing the scope and conditions under which institutional accountability may occur in other issue areas of global governance

More than a Question of Agency: Privatized Project Implementation, Accountabilities, and Global Environmental Governance

“…In that light, the logics of accountability discussed in this article could also be expressed as the means by which different types of accountability relationships cause divergence from (or convergence with) the ends of environmental governance. In a practical sense, this would also be consistent with the emphasis that Kuyper, Bäckstrand, and Schroeder () place on understanding institutional criteria and methods for holding actors accountable. Actors confront different logics of accountability when they delegate across boundaries that separate states, organizations and institutional types.…”

Accountability Challenges in the Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change

“…First, the notion that accountability relationships include a “right” (Keohane, ) to hold others accountable is problematic in increasingly networked modes of governance (cf. Kuyper, Bäckstrand, & Schroeder, ). Gordon (, p. 87) for instance makes this argument when examining accountability in cooperative initiatives involving cities.…”

“…She also contends that the most important type of accountability is nonhierarchical and horizontal, characterized by reputational accountability that requires functioning monitoring mechanisms and market accountability (providing signals for rewards or punishment). In addition, as this special issue highlights, peer accountability is key, as it allows peers to monitor and assess each other (Kuyper et al, ). Gordon's () and Bäckstrand's () observations and analyses have started to untangle the problems and suggested solutions for analysts studying contemporary climate governance.…”

Holding Polluting Countries to Account for Climate Change: Is “Loss and Damage” Up to the Task?

“…Here it is also worth noting that COP 19 was under great pressure (from member states, civil society, the media, and other stakeholders) to bring China and other “non‐Annex I” countries into a global climate agreement. Now that the UNFCCC has achieved an agreement (in the form of the Paris Climate Agreement), the ability of marginal and external actors to exercise authority through “exit” (Kuyper, Bäckstrand, & Schroeder, ) appears greatly diminished.…”