Institutional Development and Colonial Heritage within Brazil

Abstract

Institutional Development and Colonial Heritage within Brazil *This paper analyzes the determinants of local institutions and distribution of political power within a constant 'macro-institutional' setting. We show that characteristics of Brazilian municipalities related to institutional quality and distribution of political power are partly inherited from the colonial histories experienced by different areas of the country. Municipalities with origins tracing back to the sugar-cane colonial cycle -characterized by a polarized and oligarchic socioeconomic structure -display today more inequality in the distribution of endowments (land). Municipalities with origins tracing back to the gold colonial cycle -characterized by a heavily inefficient presence of the Portuguese state -display today worse governance practices and less access to justice. The colonial rent-seeking episodes are also correlated with lower provision of public goods and lower income per capita.

Spatial heterogeneities, institutions, and income: Evidence for Brazil

“…On one hand, the global results indicate that inclusive political institutions increase standards of living measured by Municipal Human Development Index (M‐HDI), Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, human capital, and income inequality, in line with other empirical studies for Brazil as (Niquito et al, 2018), (Nakabashi et al, 2013), and (Naritomi et al, 2012). On the other hand, the local GWR shows that institutional quality's effects on economic performance are heterogeneous.…”

“…We also expect the influence of both cycles to diminish in more distant regions from Portugal as the colonial extractive institutions would be less intense. Therefore, α 4 , α 5 > 0 (Naritomi et al, 2012).…”

Worker and firm heterogeneity, agglomeration, and wages in Brazil

“…13 13 The shares of sugarcane and coffee production were generated from Naritomi, Soares, and Assunção (2012). …”

Political Power, Elite Control, and Long-Run Development: Evidence from Brazil

“… See North and Weingast (1989),Sokoloff and Engerman (2000),Acemoglu and Robinson (2012).2 We adoptAcemoglu and Robinson (2006b, p.173) definition of political power: "a measure of how influential a particular group (or individual) is in the political arena when there is conflict over which policy should be implemented. "3 See for exampleLeal (1977), de Carvalho (1982.4 Related work that examine long-term effects of institutions includeBanerjee and Iyer (2005), Nunn (2008),Dell (2010), andNaritomi et al (2012).…”