Institutional relationships in Ukraine: a stable polity?

Abstract

This article examines how the choice of Ukraine’s constitutional system affects both the relationship among key constitutional actors and the prospects of institutional change. It analyzes the character of the relationship between the president and parliament in the context of their competition over control of the cabinet. It then examines how and why the institutional interests and preferences of key political and public policy actors who inhabit the presidency, the legislature and the cabinet affect the prospects of maintaining or changing the constitutional status in Ukraine. It concludes that the institutional stability in Ukraine is still in a state of flux.

Compared to What?

“…What we term the hyperactive paralysis (HP) interpretation of Brazil has been especially prominent in comparisons with postcommunist polities (Beyme, 2001;Clark & Wittrock, 2005;Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski, & Tóka, 1999, pp. 55, 90;Moser, 1999, p. 362;Papadoulis, 2004;Shvetsova, 1999). Is HP the only legitimate assessment of democratic Brazil?…”