Integrated World Modeling Theory (IWMT) Revisited

Abstract

<p>Here, I provide clarifications and discuss further issues relating to Safron (2020), “An Integrated World Modeling Theory (IWMT) of consciousness: Combining Integrated Information and Global Workspace Theories with the Free Energy Principle and Active Inference Framework; towards solving the Hard problem and characterizing agentic causation.” As a synthesis of major theories of complex systems and consciousness, with IWMT we may be able to address some of the most difficult problems in the sciences. This is a claim deserving of close scrutiny and much skepticism. What would it take to solve the Hard problem? One could answer the question of how it is possible that something like subjectivity could emerge from objective brain functioning (i.e., moving from a third person to a first person ontology), but a truly satisfying account might still require solving all the “easy” and “real” problems of consciousness. In this way, IWMT does not claim to definitively solve the Hard problem, as explaining all the particular ways that things feel across all relevant aspects of experience is likely an impossible task. Nonetheless, IWMT does claim to have made major inroads into our understanding of consciousness, and here I will attempt to justify this position by discussing challenging problems and outstanding questions with respect to philosophy, (neuro)phenomenology, computational principles, practical applications, and implications for existing theories of mind and life.</p>

An Integrated World Modeling Theory (IWMT) of consciousness: Combining Integrated Information and Global Neuronal Workspace Theories with the Free Energy Principle and Active Inference Framework; towards solving the Hard problem and characterizing agentic causation

“…[Note: A more detailed discussion of IIT's postulates and axioms can be found in IWMT Revisited (Safron et al, 2019a), in the section: "A review of IIT terminology".] Experience exists from its own intrinsic perspective (i.e., subjectivity), independent of external observers.…”

“…[Note: More details regarding neural substrates of consciousness are described below, as well as in IWMT Revisited (Safron, 2019a) in the sections: "Neural systems for coherent world modeling" and "Future directions for IIT and GWT. "] 1.3.5 Selfhood, autonomy, and consciousness By grounding IIT and GNWT within the body-centered perspective of FEP-AI, IWMT suggests that complexes of integrated information and global workspaces can entail conscious experiences if (and only if) they are capable of generating integrative world models with spatial, temporal, and causal coherence.…”

“…(Von Uexküll, 1957;Damasio, 2012;Humphrey, 2017)-IWMT argues that integrated selfhood and autonomy are required for coherent sense-making. For there to be "something that it is like"-and even more so, "something it feels like"-workspace dynamics must be grounded in models of autonomous embodiment (Safron, 2019c(Safron, , 2019a.…”

“…[Note: More details on potential mechanisms for SOHM formation and functional consequences can be found in IWMT Revisited (Safron, 2019a) in the sections: "Phenomenal binding via ESMs (Embodied Self Models)" and "Mechanisms for integration and workspace dynamics. "]…”

“…Along these lines, by enabling the generation of inferences with rapidity and reliability, SOHMs could afford approximate models capable of guiding action-perception cycles and decision-making (Von Uexküll, 1957;Fuster, 2009;Madl et al, 2011;Vul et al, 2014;Linson et al, 2018;Parr and Friston, 2018b). Further, these sensorimotor engagements may promote SOHM-formation by providing coherent sources of correlated information, so affording the possibility of learning even more sophisticated models (Pfeifer and Bongard, 2006;Safron, 2019cSafron, , 2019a. IWMT proposes this continual shaping of behavior based on rich causal world-models may be both a major adaptive function of consciousness, as well as a precondition for developing coherent conscious experience.…”