Integration of Former Enemies into National Armies in Fragile African States

Møller, Bjørn; Cawthra, Gavin

doi:10.1057/9780230605572_8

Cited by 1 publication

(2 citation statements)

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“…Comparative case studies have explored military integration's role in peace agreement implementation and peace duration, offering mixed evidence on when integration improves the chances of conflict resolution and sustaining peace (Burgess 2008;Gaub 2011;Krebs and Licklider 2015;Møller and Cawthra 2007;Wilén 2016). Single-case studies have detailed the development and implementation of military integration policies and their relative effectiveness in building peace and constructing more capable militaries (Baaz and Verweijen 2013;Licklider 2014b;Neads 2020;Samii 2013;Santos 2010b;Warner 2013).…”

Section: Existing Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…'Information' is primarily discussed as a factor in the commitment problems inherent in reaching and implementing a settlement (Hartzell 2014;Hoddie and Hartzell 2003;Verweijen 2014, 154). Other studies similarly do not address the potential effects of military integration on intelligence capacity (Burgess 2008;Gaub 2011;Møller and Cawthra 2007;Samii 2013;Warner 2013;Wilén 2016). Driscoll (2012, 121) mentions that integration 'brings soldiers with knowledge of the terrain and tactics,' but does not explore this point further.…”

Section: Existing Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

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Military integration and intelligence capacity: informational effects of incorporating former rebels

Thaler

2021

Political Research Exchange

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Military integration seeks to improve counterinsurgency and peacebuilding outcomes by incorporating former rebels into preexisting or new state security forces during or after civil wars. While peacebuilders continue to promote military integration, there is mixed evidence about its effectiveness and the mechanisms through which it affects counterinsurgency and peace duration. One underexplored mechanism is the effect of military integration on intelligence capacity and the information available to security forces. Information is key to successful counterinsurgency and peacebuilding efforts, and I argue that military integration of ex-rebels can improve intelligence capacity by providing gains in knowledge of human and physical geography, access to preexisting social networks and informants, and knowledge of the relative effectiveness of government and rebel tactics. I illustrate these improvements with evidence from conflicts across time and space and brief case narratives from the Philippines, Uganda, and Rwanda. I conclude by discussing policy implications, cases of unsuccessful integration and negative effects on intelligence, and questions for future research on the intelligence aspect of military integration.

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