INTEL XXI and the Maneuver Commander - Redefining Execution of Tactical Military Intelligence Operations

Abstract

INTEL XXI AND THE MANEUVER COMMANDER -REDEFINING EXECUTION OF TACTICAL MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS,by Major Thomas J. Kardos, 65 pages.The military's response to changes within the world political and technological environment has been termed a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). This monograph summarizes the effects that these changes will have on intelligence operations at the tactical level, or more specifically, the interaction between the tactical commander and the intelligence system which supports him.Though the definition of RMA varies from source to source, it can be distilled to the cumulative effects brought about by the progress of technology, doctrine, organization, and behavior. Recognition that the military is amidst the throes of a Revolution in Military Affairs is not sufficient to produce necessary and meaningful change. A strategy is needed in order to chart the Army's course for the near future and beyond. This concept is formulated in Army programs and has come to be known as "Force XXI". Concurrently, the Military Intelligence community is drafting its own, complementary program: "Intelligence XXI" -"INTEL XXI".An brief historical overview is presented in Section 2. A summary of the characteristics of future forces and operations as envisioned by the Force XXI and INTEL XXI programs is found in Section 3. The impact of these programs for tactical intelligence operations is discussed in Sections 4 through 7. The implications of these concepts is framed in terms of their impact on the TRADOC domains -Doctrine; Leadership; Organization (and Manning); and Training. Finally, a summary of what has been construed and recommendations are contained in the Conclusion.Whether the changes encompassed within the INTEL XXI concept actually signal a revolution in military affairs could be debated. Many changes have been proposed and experimented with in the past. Perhaps this revolution will not be gauged by the extent of the proposals, but rather by the degree to which commanders and intelligence operators and analysts maximize the potential of these evolving concepts.The length and depth of this subject is far too extensive to address in complete detail. This thesis does not portend to distill the optimal tactical intelligence organization. Equally, it is beyond the scope to address joint doctrine, research, development, and funding issues. What will be addressed, however, is a view of the consequential effects that future programs will have on the tactical Army commander's ability to leverage intelligence support in order to accurately see his battlefield environment.