Intensional profiles and different kinds of human minds. “Case studies” about Hungarian imperative-like sentence types

Abstract

The paper offers such description of some imperative-like sentence types in potential well-formed Hungarian utterances which includes a parallel representation of the linguistically encoded intensional profiles of the sentence types and actual information states in potential interlocutors’ minds. In our representational dynamic pragmasemantics framework ReALIS, we demonstrate the intensional profiles of the five basic and two “fine-tuned” sentence types as members of a system enabling addressers’ of utterances to express their beliefs, desires and intentions concerning the propositional content of the given utterances as well as the addressees’ and other people’s certain beliefs, desires and intentions (concerning the propositional content, too, or each other’s thoughts). We also provide “case studies” in which actual beliefs, desires and intentions in potential interlocutors’ minds are compared to the linguistically encoded intensional profiles of Hungarian imperative-like sentence types. In this context, the listener’s task is to calculate the speaker’s intentions (and hidden motives) on the basis of the mismatches that this comparison reveals. The paper concludes with an insight into our attempts to model the mind of individuals living with Autism Spectrum Disorder. This latter subproject is relevant since our framework provides solutions to pragmaticosemantic phenomena “at the cost” of undertaking the complex task of actually representing the structure of the human mind itself – which is not impossible but requires an adequate decision of the level of abstraction and the components to be used.

Similarities and differences between two Hungarian particles for also: szintén and is

“…the cases where is functions as an intensional/metacognitive pragmatic marker, as opposed to szintén, which acts as a coherence-signaling discourse marker (Section 5). For this analysis, we used the framework of the formal representational dynamic theory of interpretation called ℜeALIS (see, for instance, Alberti et al 2016Szeteli et al 2019, andViszket et al 2019).…”

“…ℜeALIS is presented, among others, inAlberti (2011),Alberti and Kleiber (2015),Alberti et al (2019a), in addition toAlberti et al (2016),Kleiber and Alberti (2017),Szeteli et al (2019) andViszket et al (2019), published in Poland. We have opted for this theory due to its integrative character.…”

Recalculating: The atlas of pragmatic parameters of developmental disorders

“…Compared to earlier systems, the innovation of this formal approach is that the global world model also contains mental states as recursively developing units: environment mirroring "prisms". This way ℜeALIS (see Alberti et al 2016) makes possible the formal semantic capturing of what is intensively discussed in mind theory as mentalization. Those who use the ℜeALIS framework should be aware of the fact that this is not only a possibility but also an obligation: formulating hypotheses on the mind that operates communication should be associated with regarding as, and accounting for, the resulting system as a model of the human mind.…”

“…There are, however, several research results suggesting that the "Theory of Mind deficit" is not exclusive and there are even counter-examples (Pellicano 2011). As pointed out in Alberti et al (2016), due to mathematical concepts such as iso-and homomorphism, ℜeALIS can capture the fact that, relative to the fully fledged worldlet structure in the neurotypical mind, in atypical mind types there are alternative structures reduced to numerous different extents.…”