Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language

Knobe, Joshua

doi:10.1111/1467-8284.00419

Cited by 435 publications

(537 citation statements)

References 6 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

502

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…The Knobe Effect suggests that the value we assign to the consequences of the Paxil trial will influence our assessment of the role of commercial values in the researchers' intentions and reasoning, and so our assessment of the case according to Douglas' account. Specifically, the effect predicts that we, insofar as we take these consequences to be bad, we will probably say that the researchers intended to bring them about (Knobe 2003). And it is reasonable to interpret this as an illegitimate direct role for values in the epistemic phase.…”

Section: Direct and Indirect Rolesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A new direction for science and values

Hicks

2014

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The controversy over the old ideal of "value-free science" has cooled significantly over the past decade. Many philosophers of science now agree that even ethical and political values may play a substantial role in all aspects of scientific inquiry. Consequently, in the last few years, work in science and values has become more specific: Which values may influence science, and in which ways? Or, how do we distinguish illegitimate from illegitimate kinds of influence? In this paper, I argue that this problem requires philosophers of science to take a new direction. I present two case studies in the influence of values on scientific inquiry: feminist values in archaeology and commercial values in pharmaceutical research. I offer a preliminary assessment of these cases, that the influence of values was legitimate in the feminist case, but not in the pharmaceutical case. I then turn to three major approaches to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate influences of values, including the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic values and Heather Douglas' distinction between direct and indirect roles for values. I argue that none of these three approaches gives an adequate analysis of the two cases. In the concluding section, I briefly sketch my own approach, which draws more heavily on ethics than the others, and is more promising as a solution to the current problem. This is the new direction in which I think science and values should move.

show abstract

Section: Direct and Indirect Rolesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A new direction for science and values

Hicks

2014

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In moral reasoning, desires to blame and to hold individuals morally responsible compel people to produce rational explanations that would justify their moral judgments (Alicke, 2000;Clark, Chen, & Ditto, 2015). Indeed, a growing body of research has demonstrated that the desire to hold individuals morally accountable for their immoral behaviors can lead to motivated judgments that such immoral behaviors are intended, under the agent's control, and freely chosen (Alicke, 1992(Alicke, , 2000Alicke, Rose, & Bloom, 2011;Clark et al, 2014;Cushman, Knobe, & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008;Feldman et al, 2016;Hamlin & Baron, 2014;Knobe, 2003;Knobe & Fraser, 2008;Leslie, Knobe, & Cohen, 2006;Phillips & Knobe, 2009). …”

Section: Motivated Beliefs In Free Willmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Put simply, across a broad range of psychological phenomena, "bad is stronger than good" (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001, p. 1), meaning that people tend to notice, and give greater weight to, negative actions and outcomes than positive ones. For example, research has repeatedly shown a praise-blame asymmetry in judgments of intentional action: people are more inclined to say that a behavior with negative side-effects was performed intentionally than an identical action with positive side-effects (Knobe, 2003;Pettit & Knobe, 2009). Motivated judgments of others' behavior are most pronounced in -and perhaps even driven by -cases in which the behavior is seen as harmful (Alicke, Buckingham, Zell, & Davis, 2008).…”

Section: Motivated Beliefs In Free Willmentioning

confidence: 99%

Political differences in free will belief are driven by differences in moralization

Everett¹,

Clark²,

Meindl³

et al. 2017

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Five studies tested whether political conservatives' stronger free will beliefs are driven by their broader view of morality, and thus a broader motivation to assign responsibility. On an individual difference level, Study 1 found that political conservatives' higher moral wrongness judgments accounted for their higher belief in free will. In Study 2, conservatives ascribed more free will for negative events than liberals, while no differences emerged for positive events. For actions ideologically equivalent in perceived moral wrongness, free will judgments also did not differ (Study 3), and actions that liberals perceived as more wrong, liberals judged as more free (Study 4). Finally, higher wrongness judgments mediated the effect of conservatism on free will beliefs (Study 5). Higher free will beliefs among conservatives may be explained by conservatives' tendency to moralize, which strengthens motivation to justify blame with stronger belief in free will and personal accountability.

show abstract

“…For example, some studies suggest that moral reasoning interferes with the assessment of intentionality under some specifi c circumstances, which is true both for children and adults (Knobe, 2003;Leslie, Knobe, & Cohen, 2006;Pellizzoni, Siegal, & Surian, 2009). …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…More specifi cally, Knobe (2003) demonstrated that, when judging a situation during which an action may lead to foreseen side effects, albeit neglected, adults claim that the side effects were produced on purpose when the effects were morally bad, but not when they were morally good. For example, participants were asked to evaluate the following situation: the CEO of a company started a new policy which will give him more profi t; however, it will also damage the environment.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

A Relação entre Teoria da Mente e Desenvolvimento Moral em Crianças Pré-Escolares

Loureiro

Souza

2013

Paidéia (Ribeirão Preto)

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract:The aim of the present study was to investigate the relationship between theory of mind and moral judgment (based on intention and based on motive) in a sample of Brazilian preschool children. Twenty-four 4-and 5-year olds were assessed in theory of mind and moral reasoning tasks. Although the correlation between performances in the two types of task was not signifi cant, some important effects were found: participants were better at judging intentional behaviors than accidental ones and 5-year-olds performed better than 4-year-olds in the moral reasoning task based on motive. These results suggest that more sophisticated moral reasoning is associated with the capacity to differentiate intentional and non-intentional actions as well as to identify the underlying motives of human action.Keywords: theory of mind, moral development, preschool students A Relação entre Teoria da Mente e Desenvolvimento Moral em Crianças Pré-EscolaresResumo: O objetivo deste estudo foi investigar a relação entre teoria da mente e julgamento moral (com base na intenção e com base no motivo) em uma amostra de crianças brasileiras de idade pré-escolar. Vinte e quatro crianças de 4 e 5 anos foram avaliadas por tarefas de teoria da mente e de julgamento moral. Embora a correlação entre os desempenhos nos dois tipos de tarefa não tenha se mostrado signifi cativa, alguns efeitos importantes foram encontrados: os participantes tiveram mais facilidade para julgar os comportamentos propositais do que os acidentais; e as crianças de 5 anos tiveram um desempenho melhor do que as de 4 anos na tarefa de julgamento moral com base no motivo. Esses resultados sugerem que um julgamento moral mais sofi sticado está associado a uma capacidade de diferenciar ações intencionais e não intencionais, bem como de identifi car os motivos subjacentes à ação humana. Palavras-chave: teoria da mente, desenvolvimento moral, pré-escolares La Relación entre la Teoría de la Mente y el Desarrollo Moral en Niños Pre-EscolaresResumen: La fi nalidad en el presente estudio fue investigar la relación entre la teoría de la mente y el raciocinio moral (basado en la intención y en el motivo) en una muestra de niños brasileños en edad pre-escolar. Veinticuatro niños de 4 y 5 años fueron evaluados en tareas de la teoría de la mente y de raciocinio moral. Aun que la correlación entre los resultados de los dos tipos de tarea no fue signifi cativa, algunos efectos importantes fueron encontrados: los participantes eran mejores en juzgar las conductas intencionales que las accidentales; y los niños de 5 años alcanzaron mejor desempeño que aquellos de 4 años en la tarea de raciocinio moral basado en el motivo. Estos resultados sugieren que un raciocinio moral más sofi sticado se asocia a la capacidad de distinguir entre acciones intencionales y no intencionales, así como de identifi car los motivos subyacentes de la acción humana.Palabras clave: teoría de la mente, desarrollo moral, pre escolares

show abstract

Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language

Cited by 435 publications

References 6 publications

A new direction for science and values

A new direction for science and values

Political differences in free will belief are driven by differences in moralization

A Relação entre Teoria da Mente e Desenvolvimento Moral em Crianças Pré-Escolares

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About