Intentionality and the Non-Psychological

Martin, C. B.; Pfeifer, Karl

doi:10.2307/2107668

Cited by 106 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…So this view does not mean reductionism: physics cannot explain problems of psychology or education without changing itself to psychology or science of education. Neither does this mean materialism (because nominalist cannot be materialist) nor panpsychism (Martin & Pfeifer, 1986). But now we know that there is no special mystery in the mental existence of humans-in addition to the normal mystery of the existence of the whole reality.…”

Section: B Martin's Ontology As An Alternativementioning

confidence: 98%

From the Ontology of Interaction to the Semiotics of Education

Pikkarainen

2013

Interaction in Educational Domains

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: B Martin's Ontology As An Alternativementioning

confidence: 98%

From the Ontology of Interaction to the Semiotics of Education

Pikkarainen

2013

Interaction in Educational Domains

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…12 See Ryle 1973, 259. 13 See Martin &Pfeifer 1998 andMolnar 2004 chapter 3.4ff. Third, if we have an intuitive grip on of-ness or being directed towards at all, obvious counter-examples arise of non-intentional mental states such as moods suggests themselves. Jacques's depression is a mental state, but what is it about?…”

Section: It Is Grammatically Correct To Continuementioning

confidence: 99%

Brentano's Empiricism and the Philosophy of Intentionality

Textor

2017

Philos Phenomenol Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Brentano's Thesis that intentionality is the mark of the mental is central to analytic philosophy of mind as well as phenomenology. The contemporary discussion assumes that it is a formulation of an analytic definition of the mental. I argue that this assumption is mistaken. According to Brentano, many philosophical concepts can only be elucidated by perceiving their instances because these concepts are abstracted from perception. The concept of the mental is one of these concepts. We need to understand Brentano's Thesis accordingly: It is a piece of advice on how to become introspectively aware of the distinctive feature of mental phenomena. On this understanding of Brentano's Thesis standard objections to it no longer arise.

show abstract

“…Possible non-existence, then, prevents there being general rules allowing exportation or existential generalisation in the context of intentional verbs. 56 Martin and Pfeifer (1986); Lycan (1969); Chisholm (1957, pp. 170-171).…”

Section: Inexistence: Failures Of Exportation and Truthmentioning

confidence: 99%

Finality revived: powers and intentionality

Oderberg

2016

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Proponents of physical intentionality argue that the classic hallmarks of intentionality highlighted by Brentano are also found in purely physical powers. Critics worry that this idea is metaphysically obscure at best, and at worst leads to panpsychism or animism. I examine the debate in detail, finding both confusion and illumination in the physical intentionalist thesis. Analysing a number of the canonical features of intentionality, I show that they all point to one overarching phenomenon of which both the mental and the physical are kinds, namely finality. This is the finality of 'final causes', the long-discarded idea of universal action for an end to which recent proponents of physical intentionality are in fact pointing whether or not they realise it. I explain finality in terms of the concept of specific indifference, arguing that in the case of the mental, specific indifference is realised by the process of abstraction, which has no correlate in the case of physical powers. This analysis, I conclude, reveals both the strength and weakness of rational creatures such as us, as well as demystifying (albeit only partly) the way in which powers work.

show abstract

Intentionality and the Non-Psychological

Cited by 106 publications

References 0 publications

From the Ontology of Interaction to the Semiotics of Education

From the Ontology of Interaction to the Semiotics of Education

Brentano's Empiricism and the Philosophy of Intentionality

Finality revived: powers and intentionality

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About