International Assortative Matching in the European Labor Market

Peeters, Thomas; Ours, Jan C. van

doi:10.2139/ssrn.4206222

Cited by 1 publication

(4 citation statements)

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“…The noteworthy point is that tempting opportunities beyond national borders are not specific to less developed countries. The results of Peeters and Ours suggest that although passing through international borders always complicates migration, the added value of matching between good teams and good coaches is so high that even acclaimed coaches in Europe are recruited by more wealthy teams from other countries [38]. This high-skill worker migration can even change the wages in the destination country which can be tracked if considered a dynamic mechanism [73] Result 4: To build on the results of Result 3, it can be inferred that in the case of an overqualified individual cooperating with a weak firm, the workers will reduce their productivity to meet the individual rationality condition.…”

Section: B Rationality Condition Of Game Agents At the Time Of Recrui...mentioning

confidence: 91%

“…This means that more effective workers with higher skills should be recruited in more productive firms [55], [77]. The results of Peters and Orr also suggested that more effective coaches are attracted to more productive teams not only on the national but also on the international level and in the European region [38].…”

Section: The Ex-post Efficiency Condition Of the Recruitment Mechanismmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…Assortative matching in market design addresses the matching of couples seeking to increase productivity [24]. The time to reach a stable matching and its productivity are typically discussed in assortative matchings [2], [24], [25], [38], [39]. For instance, Ashalgi et al introduced new protocols to prevent congestion.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In one of the latest articles, Peeters and Ours examined the properties of assortative matching in the football coach market. This work defined the concept of productivity for both agents of teams and coaches similarly to what we have proposed in this work [38]. Pu and Yuan also investigated various aspects of two-sided matching, such as game agents' preferences and diversity, the impact of personal and social properties on priorities, and the presence of intermediaries in two-sided games to enhance assortative matching models and draw them closer to actuality [39].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Implementing Mechanism Design Framework on Recruitment with a Wage Function based on Value Engineering

2023

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The present study introduces a mechanism design theory framework to address the recruitment problem. Moreover, the study examines the features of the mechanism for the payment function based on value engineering. A two-stage model is also proposed for the mechanism based on the investigation of the initial documentation of the workers at the time of recruitment and their performance over the probationary period. The mechanism takes advantage of the concept of value engineering to account for the critical factors in selecting a firm for collaboration from a worker's perspective, such as wage and subjective preferences. Various features of the mechanism, such as incentive compatibility (honesty) of the worker and the firm, the individual rationality of the worker and the firm, and the ex-post efficiency of the mechanism were investigated based on the proposed wage by introducing the utility function of each agent. Implementing recruitment in the form of a mechanism revealed that value engineering based pricing is a weighted VCG mechanism, and one of the factors in value engineering success would thus be the practical implementation of an optimized model. Examining recruitment in the simple framework of the mechanism alongside the introduction of the proper structure to study the influence of various features of the worker and the firm indicated that it is possible to implement more complex models such as payment function change, message exchange, and release of some assumptions regarding the workers and the firm.INDEX TERMS Mechanism design theory, recruitment, value engineering.

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Section: B Rationality Condition Of Game Agents At the Time Of Recrui...mentioning

confidence: 91%