International Framework Agreements: global industrial relations between rights and bargaining

Abstract

In this paper I discus s the emergence and main features of International Framework Agreements (IFAs). I argue that they constitute an advance, both, over social dialogue in international organisations as well as Codes of Conduct. Although framework agreements dispense neither with international regulation nor national application they should be regarded as an important feature of international industrial relations. A discussion of the substantive and procedural provisions leads to a hierarchical distinction between 'rights' agreements and 'bargaining' agreements. Another crucial and distinctive aspect relates to the institutional relation of framework agreements to European Works Councils (EWCs) and World Works Councils (WWCs). Finally, some of the substantive and procedural aspects of framework agreements are discussed in the context of their respective supply chain structures.

TNC Motives for Signing International Framework Agreements: A Continuous Bargaining Model of Stakeholder Pressure

“…The main difference between codes of conduct and IFAs is that while codes are unilaterally adopted by corporations, IFAs are negotiated and signed by both the corporation and representatives of the labour union movement. Hammer (2005) and Sobczak (2007) demonstrate in their reviews of existing IFAs that there are various forms of IFAs, making it difficult to pinpoint the exact characteristics of IFAs. However, in terms of content, IFAs build on ILO Conventions and UN Conventions, cover both companies' own and their suppliers' operations, and involve trade unions in negotiation (Hammer, 2005;IMF, 2006;ITGLWF, 2007;Sobczak, 2007).…”

“…Hammer (2005) and Sobczak (2007) demonstrate in their reviews of existing IFAs that there are various forms of IFAs, making it difficult to pinpoint the exact characteristics of IFAs. However, in terms of content, IFAs build on ILO Conventions and UN Conventions, cover both companies' own and their suppliers' operations, and involve trade unions in negotiation (Hammer, 2005;IMF, 2006;ITGLWF, 2007;Sobczak, 2007). Egels-Zandén and Hyllman (2007) also demonstrate that IFAs include more processual aspects of worker representation than do codes of conduct.…”

“…This almost exclusive research focus on codes of conduct exists even though the number of signed IFAs has been consistently and rapidly increasing (cf. Hammer, 2005), making IFAs an important complement to codes of conduct. The sparse existing research into IFAs has also almost exclusively been conducted from union and NGO perspectives, providing limited insight into the central research question of what motivates corporations to sign IFAs.…”

“…However, the limited success of these demands made workers' rights representatives direct most of their attention to individual corporations rather than international organisations, this second approach being operationalised by promoting so-called codes of conduct and international framework agreements (e.g., Braun and Gearhart, 2004;Compa, 2004;Fairbrother and Hammer, 2005). While codes of conduct are the transnational industrial relations system preferred by most NGOs and TNCs (Schlegelmilch and Houston, 1989;Sethi, 1999;Gallin, 2000;Guillén et al, 2002;Nijhof et al, 2003;Compa, 2004;Connor, 2004), most labour unions and a few TNCs prefer an international framework agreement (IFA) system (Gallin, 2000;Connor, 2004;Hammer, 2005;Riisgaard, 2005).…”

¿Regulación internacional del trabajo a partir de los autocompromisos de las empresas transnacionales?

“…Los Acuerdos Marco Internacionales pueden ser considerados como las primeras convenciones colectivas internacionales, aunque con una gama bastante limitada de contenidos regulatorios. Estos obligan a las empresas (y frecuentemente también, por su intermedio, a los proveedores) al cumplimiento de unos estándares sociales, especialmente los derechos laborales fundamentales de la Oit, y contienen también prescripciones procedimentales para su puesta en práctica (Müller, et al, 2004;Hammer, 2005;Riisgaard, 2005). Igualmente, se convierten con frecuencia en obligatorios para los proveedores.…”