International Governance and Local Resistance in Kosovo: the Thin Line between Ethical, Emancipatory and Exclusionary Politics

Abstract

This paper examines the emergence and implications of local resistance against the practice of liberal peace-building in post-conflict Kosovo, as pursued by the international community and local authorities. Exploring the prospects and limitations of local resistance, as articulated through social movements and institutionalised forms of politics, enables us to examine the applicability and potential implications of post-liberal and emancipatory peace, approaches recently propogated by critical approaches to peace-building. Drawing on an original analysis of the discourse and affirmative action of local resistance against the international governance of Kosovo, this paper will argue that different types of local resistance articulate a thin line between ethical, emancipatory and exclusionary practices. Due to the inherent contradictions of resistance movements, the challenges associated with local ownership, grassroots democratisation, and the emancipation and empowerment of local agency cannot be resolved entirely. Indeed, there is a persistent danger that subalterns articulate their needs and interests not only according to an acceptable public transcript for the group's inner dynamics, but also in relation to the dominant authority, whether it is local or international. This paper illustrates that where there is power there will be resistance, and where there is resistance there will be exclusion and further subordination.

Local contestation against the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo

“…In line with the sovereignty-related, nationalist frame Kosovo was independent; thus the agreement to deploy EULEX under the status-neutral UN umbrella (so not acknowledging this independence) triggered strong contestation. On November 19 and December 2, 2008, Vetëvendosje, together with almost 20 civil society organizations, brought over 40,000 participants on the streets (Visoka, 2011). These protests, the biggest in the postwar history of the country, were also publicly (although cautiously) supported by the government, other political parties and widely covered by sympathetic media.…”

“…Such top-down approach has been criticized not only by academics as part of the "local turn" in peacebuilding (Chandler, 2000;Richmond & Franks, 2009;Visoka, 2011), but it has also been seen as potentially contentious by local actors. For instance, problems related to the lack of legitimacy for EUdriven reforms have been highlighted in the literature on Europeanization (Noutcheva, 2012) and on Security Sector Reform-related activities (Sahin, 2017).…”

“…Contestation against EULEX should be set against the background of earlier contestation against UNMIK, particularly for social movement Vetëven-dosje/Self-Determination, led by Albin Kurti (see Visoka, 2011). Contestation against UNMIK was rare, even though its rule often created dissatisfaction (Cocozzelli, 2013).…”

Talking past each other: Regional and domestic resistance in the Burundian intervention scene

“…In this section, we explicate our take on resistance before embedding it into the wider discussion on resistance in the intervention scene in the next section. Despite the plurality of approaches through which resistance is studied (Weitz, 2001: 669), it is possible to identify at least two widely accepted elements: firstly, resistance refers to a sense of action in the broadest possible sense, ranging from non-participating (Mac Ginty, 2012) to questioning to objecting (Modigliani and Rochat, 1995: 112) to obstructing (Visoka, 2011). Secondly, resistance is founded on a sense of opposition (Hollander and Einwohner, 2004).…”

“…Nadarajah and Rampton, 2015). Based on such a descriptive rather than prescriptive understanding of resistance (Millar, 2014), we contend that it is crucial to examine emancipatory, exclusionary (Visoka, 2011), illiberal and even oppressive (Mac Ginty, 2011;Richmond, 2010) forms of resistance and their entanglements with domination. Parts of the national political elite may not only exploit loopholes created by liberal peacebuilding for their own interests (Richmond and Mitchell, 2011), but they may also create different versions of peace and order (Öjendal and Ou, 2013).…”