Introducing alethic nihilism

Abstract

The chapter begins by assuming, for the sake of argument, the existence of a rich ontology of propositions, enough to cover everything that might be asserted or believed. It then lays out the tenets of alethic nihilism. The nihilist believes that ‘is true’ is a genuine predicate, but claims that it has an empty extension. The same goes for ‘is false’. The nihilist analyses the concept of truth in a Ramseyan fashion, using non-substitutional quantification into sentence position; and they claim that the reason we have ‘is true’ (and other synonymous predicates of other languages) is that they enhance our expressive power. Having introduced nihilism, the chapter shows how it resists the objection ‘If nothing is true, then the proposition that nothing is true is true. So nihilism implies that there is a counterexample to nihilism, namely, nihilism itself.’ Finally, nihilism is compared with deflationism.