Introduction: Wilfrid Sellars and the Foundations of Normativity

Consequences of Behaviorism

“…But to conclude from these points that describing behavior as responsive to norms demands a nondescriptive, normative conception of terms overextends the discussion of linguistic roles. As I have argued elsewhere (Olen 2016), we should not confuse the idea that nonextensional terms can play a legitimate nondescriptive, yet nonlogical, role with the idea that descriptions or explanations of behaviors that use those terms require a nondescriptive characterization. 14 It may well be that normative and semantic discourses demand a metalinguistic characterization, but this does not entail that our pragmatic metalanguage—one that accounts for what we are doing when speaking in certain ways—need be a nonfactual, normative account.…”

“… 2 Despite moving away from his early position, one still finds Sellars (1967, 72) claiming that certain forms of behaviorism (such as Gilbert Ryle’s logical behaviorism) accurately reconstruct “a dimension of our concept of mind.” See Olen (2016, chapter 4) for a longer discussion of the nuances in Sellars’ behaviorism. …”

“…In fact, many of Sellars’ earliest publications are preoccupied with metaphilosophical questions (though their definition of philosophy as a “formal science” precludes behavioral science considerations from working their way into philosophical concepts). See Carus (2004), Olen (2016), and Brandhoff (forthcoming) for an account of these issues.…”

On the very idea of normative foundations in critical social theory

“…23.In addition to the work already mentioned, Sosa (1997) puts Sellars’ attempt to quash the given in a longer historical context and suggests that Descartes had already solved the issue; Bonevac (2002) criticizes Sellars on the given; Alston (2002) rejects Sellars’ argument against the given; Rosenberg (2006) rejects Alston’s rejection; DeVries (2005) offers a general overview of Sellars’ work; Lance (2008) describes the relation between Sellars and more recent American philosophy, as well as offering help on the relation between functionalism and normativity; O’Shea (2010) offers an argument about the normative/natural distinction in Sellars that differs slightly from McDowell’s; Olen (2016) puts Sellars’ arguments about normativity in the context of his own philosophical development; Kalpokas (2017) is also critical. Many of these critical pieces are responding to the work outlined in Maher (2012).…”