Intuitions are Used as Evidence in Philosophy

Climenhaga, Nevin

doi:10.1093/mind/fzw032

Cited by 29 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…The proposed schema is unfailing and corresponds to foolproof inference schemata in logicsee (Bocheński 1968, Chapter 12). It should be also stressed that since the described process of reasoning in biological agents does not have to be aware, the proposed approach can be a good starting point to analyze intuitive reasoning (Climenhaga 2018).…”

Section: The Truth In Autonomous Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Systemic Concept of Contextual Truth

Bielecki

2020

Found Sci

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In this paper the truth is studied in the frame of autonomous systems theory. The method of the truth verification is worked out in its functional aspect. The verification is based on comparison of the predicted inner state of the autonomous agent, that is the cognitive subject, to the achieved inner state of the agent. The state is achieved as the result of performing the action in the real world—the agent’s environment. The action design is created on the basis of the agent’s model of the world. The truth is defined as the adequacy of the model of the real world in the context of the goal that is assumed to be reached as the effect of the performed action. The concepts of the cognitive subject, the truth bearings and the knowledge are redefined. The classical problems of aletheiology and epistemology are discussed in the light of the proposed approach. The cybernetic construct of an autonomous agent allows the researcher to consider a wide class of cognitive entities, which, in the previous approaches, have been limited only to human beings as cognitive subjects.

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Section: The Truth In Autonomous Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Systemic Concept of Contextual Truth

Bielecki

2020

Found Sci

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“…Alternatively, gut instinct or intuition regards neoliberalism's supposed negative effects may be what scholars seek to convey. Instinct in the guise of ‘commonsense’ or ‘just being the case’ has, some epistemic conservatives believe, a claim to our attention (Fumerton, ), and it is proposed that intuition can stand as evidence in certain circumstances (Climenhaga, ; Maguire, ; Ramsey, ).…”

Section: Rebuttals and Closurementioning

confidence: 99%

Neoliberalism and neoliberals: What are we talking about?

Lipscomb

2019

Nursing Inquiry

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The terms neoliberalism and neoliberal play a variety of roles ranging from major to trivial in the papers they appear in. Both phrases carry pejorative connotations in nurse writing. Yet irrespective of the role assumed in argument, readers are rarely provided with enough information to determine what the descriptors mean in a substantive or concrete sense. It is proposed that scholars who use these terms in their work should consider expressing themselves more carefully than often occurs at present. Virtue signalling in academic writing should, absent critical argument, be discouraged.

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“…Now, there is no shortage of ammunition for this line of reply. A quick survey of the recent literature reveals discontent with close to every aspect of Cappelen and Deutsch's attempts to establish ID (Chalmers 2014;Weatherson 2014;Weinberg 2014;Nado 2016;Climenhaga 2017;Brown 2017).…”

Section: Objections To the Irrelevance Claimmentioning

confidence: 99%

No hope for the Irrelevance Claim

Egler

2019

Philos Stud

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Empirical findings about intuitions putatively cast doubt on the traditional methodology of philosophy. Herman Cappelen and Max Deutsch have argued that these methodological concerns are unmotivated as experimental findings about intuitions are irrelevant for assessments of the methodology of philosophy—I dub this the ‘Irrelevance Claim’. In this paper, I first explain that for Cappelen and Deutsch to vindicate the Irrelevance Claim from a forceful objection, their arguments have to establish that intuitions play no epistemically significant role whatsoever in philosophy—call this the ‘Orthogonality Claim’. I then argue that even under a charitable reading of their views Cappelen and Deutsch fail to establish the Orthogonality Claim. Lastly, I discuss empirical evidence that the Orthogonality Claim is false. The arguments in this paper will demonstrate that Cappelen and Deutsch cannot motivate the Irrelevance Claim and that their replies to recent experimental attacks on traditional methodology of philosophy do not succeed.

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Intuitions are Used as Evidence in Philosophy

Cited by 29 publications

References 25 publications

The Systemic Concept of Contextual Truth

The Systemic Concept of Contextual Truth

Neoliberalism and neoliberals: What are we talking about?

No hope for the Irrelevance Claim

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