Is conscious perception gradual or dichotomous? A comparison of report methodologies during a visual task

Overgaard, Morten; Rote, Julian A.; Mouridsen, Kim; Ramsøy, Thomas Z.

doi:10.1016/j.concog.2006.04.002

Cited by 299 publications

(256 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…Importantly, in respect of subjective visibility, we are following what is now a large body of literature that probes the strength of conscious experience using such measures (e.g., Lamy, et al, 2008;Overgaard, Rote, Mouridsen, & Ramsoy, 2006;Sergent & Dehaene, 2004) including carefully considered comparisons of different scales (Sandberg, Timmermans, Overgaard, & Cleeremans, 2010). Of most significance, participants seem to use the scales consistently, with little evidence of confusion on their part.…”

Section: Subjective Visibility Measurementioning

confidence: 99%

The experiential blink: Mapping the cost of working memory encoding onto conscious perception in the attentional blink

Pincham

Bowman

Szűcs

2016

Cortex

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The attentional blink (AB) represents a cognitive deficit in reporting the second of two targets (T2), when that second target appears 200-600msec after the first (T1). However, it is unclear how this paradigm impacts the subjective visibility (that is, the conscious perception) of T2, and whether the temporal profile of T2 report accuracy matches the temporal profile of subjective visibility. In order to compare report accuracy and subjective visibility, we asked participants to identify T1 and T2, and to rate the subjective visibility of T2 across two experiments. Event-related potentials were also measured. The results revealed different profiles for the report of T2 versus the subjective visibility of T2, particularly when T1 and T2 appeared within 200msec of one another. Specifically, T2 report accuracy was high but T2 visibility was low when the two targets appeared in close temporal succession, suggesting what we call the Experiential Blink is different from the classic AB. Electrophysiologically, at lag-1, the P3 component was modulated more by subjective visibility than by report accuracy. Collectively, the data indicate that the deficit in accurately reporting T2 is not the same as the deficit in subjectively experiencing T2. This suggests that traditional understandings of the AB may require adjustment and that, consistent with other findings, working memory encoding and conscious perception may not be synonymous.

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Section: Subjective Visibility Measurementioning

confidence: 99%

The experiential blink: Mapping the cost of working memory encoding onto conscious perception in the attentional blink

Pincham

Bowman

Szűcs

2016

Cortex

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“…Finally, TAC can also be regarded as a synthesis of all-or-none [16,151] and graded [152] views of conscious representation. Indeed, through the stages of representations and processing in TAC both all-or-none ignition processes, and gradual evidence accumulation, amplification and consolidation processes, take place.…”

Section: (C) Relationships With Other Theories and Further Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The interplay of attention and consciousness in visual search, attentional blink and working memory consolidation

Raffone

Srinivasan

Leeuwen

2014

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

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Despite the acknowledged relationship between consciousness and attention, theories of the two have mostly been developed separately. Moreover, these theories have independently attempted to explain phenomena in which both are likely to interact, such as the attentional blink (AB) and working memory (WM) consolidation. Here, we make an effort to bridge the gap between, on the one hand, a theory of consciousness based on the notion of global workspace (GW) and, on the other, a synthesis of theories of visual attention. We offer a theory of attention and consciousness (TAC) that provides a unified neurocognitive account of several phenomena associated with visual search, AB and WM consolidation. TAC assumes multiple processing stages between early visual representation and conscious access, and extends the dynamics of the global neuronal workspace model to a visual attentional workspace (VAW). The VAWis controlled by executive routers, higher-order representations of executive operations in the GW, without the need for explicit saliency or priority maps. TAC leads to newly proposed mechanisms for illusory conjunctions, AB, inattentional blindness and WM capacity, and suggests neural correlates of phenomenal consciousness. Finally, the theory reconciles the all-or-none and graded perspectives on conscious representation

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“…Simple binary choices, where subjects only respond positively or negatively to whether they have perceived a visual stimulus, have proven not to capture the graded nature of visual perception. We therefore adopted a modified version of the perception awareness scale (12,13) in which subjects rate the clarity of their perceptual experience on an ordinal scale. Similar subjective measures of clarity have been used in patients (14), and it has proven to be a more indicative measure of perceptual clarity than strict dichotic measures (12,13).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We therefore adopted a modified version of the perception awareness scale (12,13) in which subjects rate the clarity of their perceptual experience on an ordinal scale. Similar subjective measures of clarity have been used in patients (14), and it has proven to be a more indicative measure of perceptual clarity than strict dichotic measures (12,13). Therefore, to quantify the effect of TMS, one of four arrow-like figures was displayed as the second light.…”

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confidence: 99%

Action-blindsight in healthy subjects after transcranial magnetic stimulation

Christensen

Kristiansen

Rowe

et al. 2008

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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Clinical cases of blindsight have shown that visually guided movements can be accomplished without conscious visual perception. Here, we show that blindsight can be induced in healthy subjects by using transcranial magnetic stimulation over the visual cortex. Transcranial magnetic stimulation blocked the conscious perception of a visual stimulus, but subjects still corrected an ongoing reaching movement in response to the stimulus. The data show that correction of reaching movements does not require conscious perception of a visual target stimulus, even in healthy people. Our results support previous results suggesting that an efference copy is involved in movement correction, and this mechanism seems to be consistent even for movement correction without perception.consciousness ͉ perception ͉ reaching ͉ efference copy

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Is conscious perception gradual or dichotomous? A comparison of report methodologies during a visual task

Cited by 299 publications

References 12 publications

The experiential blink: Mapping the cost of working memory encoding onto conscious perception in the attentional blink

The experiential blink: Mapping the cost of working memory encoding onto conscious perception in the attentional blink

The interplay of attention and consciousness in visual search, attentional blink and working memory consolidation

Action-blindsight in healthy subjects after transcranial magnetic stimulation

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