Is Gerontocracy Harmful for Growth? a Comparative Study of Seven European Countries

Atella, Vincenzo; Carbonari, Lorenzo

doi:10.1016/s1514-0326(17)30007-7

Cited by 21 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…Despite our data do not allow to disentangle between intensive and extensive margin in labor market, this result is in line with the existing evidence on the role of public intervention as a significant driver of job creation and growth (see e.g. Aschauer 1989Aschauer , 1990Richmond 1992, 1993;Morrision and Schwartz 1996;Everaert and Heylen 2001;Bom and Ligthart 2008;Heintz 2010;Atella and Carbonari 2017).…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 88%

Hours worked in selected OECD countries: an empirical assessment

Carbonari

Atella

Samà

2017

International Review of Applied Economics

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In this paper, we empirically assess the evolution of the aggregate hours worked, with a particular emphasis on their age structure, in a sample of OECD countries, along the period 1970-2007. We show that the age composition of the workforce has a large and statistically significant effect on hours worked volatility. To exploit the multilevel structure of our data, we use a Mixed Linear Model to investigate the consequences of (i) demographic change, (ii) sector-specific, and (iii) country-specific factors on hours worked by 'young' (aged 15-29) and 'prime-aged' (29+) individuals. We show that changes in workforce demographics, captured by the ratio between population older than 29 and population younger than 29, are strongly and significantly correlated with the amount of hours worked by 'young' individuals. We also document the impact of sectoral capital intensity and profitability on the dynamics of (aggregate) hours worked. Finally, we show that productive public expenditure, here proxied by the public investment in ICT, is beneficial for the hours worked both by young and prime-aged individuals.

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 88%

Hours worked in selected OECD countries: an empirical assessment

Carbonari

Atella

Samà

2017

International Review of Applied Economics

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“…Yet, this explanation is flatly contradicted by the results of most of the empirical research to date. Older leaders produce less economic growth in democracies (Atella & Carbonari, 2017) and in autocracies (Jong‐A‐Pin & Mierau, 2011, p. 289). They are also more likely to initiate international conflicts (Horowitz, McDermott, & Stam, 2005; Potter, 2007) and to become the target of interstate disputes (Bak & Palmer, 2010), and less likely to win wars in which they are involved (Simonton, 1984).…”

Section: Are Older Leaders Better?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the same spirit, Geys and Mause (2016) find that in the United Kingdom, retiring MPs (i.e., those over 65 who do not intend to run for reelection) are more prone to shirking in the strict sense—that is, substituting leisure for work (see also Willumsen & Goetz, 2017; Lott, 1990, and Clark & Lucas Williams, 2014 on the United States; Bailer & Ohmura, 2018 on Germany). Shorter time horizons may also be the reason behind the poor economic performance of aging leaders: in democracies, older politicians become less likely to invest in policies that would benefit growth in the long run (Atella & Carbonari, 2017; McClean, 2019); in autocracies, they become more likely to prey on the economy in order to maximize their own wealth (Jong‐A‐Pin & Mierau, 2011, p. 289).…”

Section: Are Older Leaders Better?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Gerontocracy in a comparative perspective: Explaining why political leaders are (almost always) older than their constituents

Magni-Berton

Panel

2020

Sociology Compass

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Gerontocracy, in its narrowest sense, refers to political systems ruled by elderly people, whether de jure or de facto. Although formal gerontocratic rules are progressively disappearing, contemporary political systems are still governed by individuals who are significantly older than the mean voter. This article reviews existing explanations for the prevalence of gerontocracy. To summarize main findings, gerontocracy cannot be explained by the leadership qualities of older rulers: aging leaders do not perform better in office and voters seem to be aware of it. Instead, existing research suggests that gerontocracy can be explained by strategic considerations. In autocracies, the selectorate tends to choose aging leaders in order to reduce their expected tenure length. In democracies, voters are more likely to select experienced candidates, which they expect to be more effective at advancing the interests of their constituency: this premium put on experience mechanically lengthens political careers and increases the age of the average politician. Finally, older voters, which participate more in politics, tend to prefer older politicians, because they (correctly) expect them to better defend their own interests.

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“…Based on the concept of gerontocracy, it emphasizes in age criteria, perhaps the +60-year-old leader is desirable (Atella & Carbonari, 2017;Bytheway, 1995). However, this system always gives an opportunity to the young generation, in the case that it must make sure that the next candidates will be loyal to the old system.…”

Section: Ruled By the Old Monksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Gerontocracy of the Buddhist monastic administration in Thailand

Buaban

2021

Simulacra

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This paper examines the monastic administration in Thai Buddhism, which is ruled by the senior monks and supported by the government. It aims to answer two questions; (1) why the Sangha’s administration has been designed to serve the bureaucratic system that monks abandon social and political justices, and (2) how the monastic education curriculum are designed to support such a conservative system. Ethnographic methodology was conducted and collected data were analyzed through the concept of gerontocracy. It found that (1) Thai Buddhism gains supports from the government much more than other religions. Parallel with the state’s bureaucratic system, the hierarchical conservative council contains the elderly monks. Those committee members choose to respond to the government policy in order to maintain supports rather than to raise social issues; (2) gerontocracy is also facilitated by the idea of Theravada itself. In both theory and practice, the charismatic leader should be the old one, implying the condition of being less sexual feeling, hatred, and ignorance. Based on this criterion, the moral leader is more desirable than the intelligent. The concept of “merits from previous lives” is reinterpreted and reproduced to pave the way for the non-democratic system.

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Is Gerontocracy Harmful for Growth? a Comparative Study of Seven European Countries

Cited by 21 publications

References 33 publications

Hours worked in selected OECD countries: an empirical assessment

Hours worked in selected OECD countries: an empirical assessment

Gerontocracy in a comparative perspective: Explaining why political leaders are (almost always) older than their constituents

Gerontocracy of the Buddhist monastic administration in Thailand

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