Is mistrust self-fulfilling?

Reuben, Ernesto; Sapienza, Paola; Zingales, Luigi

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2009.04.007

Cited by 94 publications

(70 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…Given that MBA programs are meant to establish close networks among their students, it is not unlikely that there was some esprit de corps connecting the subjects in this setting. Accordingly, Reuben et al (2009) find evidence of guilt aversion. Ellingsen et al (2010) use an anonymous double blind protocol.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 90%

“…My main finding that shared identity induces the influence of second-order beliefs on action explains why guilt aversion has been rejected in anonymous experiments (i.e., Ellingsen, Johannesson, Tjøtta, & Torsvik, 2010), while it has been confirmed in experiments that allow for some form of relationship between participants (Charness & Dufwenberg 2006, Reuben et al 2009). This finding structures the hitherto inconclusive literature on guilt aversion (for a review, see below).…”

Section: Motivationmentioning

confidence: 92%

“…He concludes that second-order beliefs cannot explain the effect of promises in trust games. Reuben et al (2009) conduct an experiment in which they elicit investors' beliefs in a trust game and report them to trustees. They do find evidence in favor of guilt aversion.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Vanberg concludes that people have a preference for keeping a promise, independently of second-order beliefs. Reuben et al (2009) use 56 subjects in one session, all of whom were MBA Students at the Kellogg Business School. This school does not have more than 650 students in total.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Generally, this method of letting senders condition their amounts sent on receivers' previously stated beliefs seems to be standard in the literature on guilt aversion (Bellemare, Sebald, & Suetens, 2013;Ellingsen et al, 2010;Reuben et al, 2009).…”

Section: Game Stagementioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

The Short Arm of Guilt: Does it Only Hit Who is Close?

Morell

2014

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractIn a laboratory experiment, I test whether guilt aversion, i.e., a preference to fulfill other people's expectations, plays out stronger if agents are socially close. I induce two different minimal group identities in participants and randomly assign participants to one of two treatments. Senders either play a dictator game with a receiver from their own group (ingroup treatment) or from the other group (outgroup treatment). I let senders condition their amount sent on second-order beliefs. I find that, in the realm of realistic beliefs (i.e., the sender expects the receiver to expect the sender to send no more than half of the pie), the positive influence of second-order beliefs on how much the sender sends is stronger in the ingroup treatment. In both treatments, about half of the senders remain unaffected by second-order beliefs. In the ingroup treatment, unaffected senders identify less with their group than affected senders do. This is not true for the outgroup treatment.

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Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 90%