Is There a Metaphysically Robust Distinction between Natural and Artificial Dispositions?

Abstract

Dispositions abound in our world. Intuitively, some of them are natural. Fragile objects are disposed to shatter if struck. Electrons are disposed to repel each other. Crimson surfaces are disposed to reflect light at a specific range of wavelength. Again intuitively, some other dispositions are artificial. Visual recognition systems are disposed to identify individuals when target facial traits are detected. Aircraft autopilot systems are disposed to regulate altitude and cruise speed. Predictive text technologies are disposed to output the correct word we might type next. Is there a metaphysically robust distinction between natural and artificial dispositions? This chapter argues that there is not. Drawing on the metaphysics literature of powers, I discuss eight plausible candidate features that might ground a substantive distinction between these kinds of dispositions. I offer reasons for thinking that they all fail or are otherwise wanting. A positive conclusion emerges: if natural dispositions are real properties, so are artificial dispositions.