Joint coordination contract for capital‐constrained supply chains under asymmetric information

Yan, Bo; Liu, Yanping; Jin, Zijie

doi:10.1002/mde.3678

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 77 publications

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“…Aslani et al [35] analyze the coordination of pricing and product greenness in a dualchannel supply chain and propose a transshipment contract to coordinate pricing and greening decisions in the dual-channel supply chain. Other aspects, e.g., cost sharing contract [36,37], cost-sharing-revenue-sharing hybrid contract [38,39], buy-back contract [40], and wholesale price contract [41], are also studied. The new retail focuses on the high integration of online and offline channels.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on Incentive and Coordination Strategy of Fresh Products’ Supply Chain with Delivery Time under New Retail

Zhang

Ding

2023

Systems

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The new retail focuses on the high integration between online and offline channels. The main problems faced by the development of the new retail are the interest balance of all decision subjects, the pricing strategy, and the coordination of online and offline channels. This paper considers the effect of the new retail firms’ delivery time and establishes a two-part tariff contract to study the decision-making and coordination of the new retail fresh products supply chain. This paper constructs cooperative and non-cooperative models and employs the cooperative model as the benchmark case to realize the coordination. It is found that when the delivery time has little effect on the market demand, the offline store often should pay more fixed charges to the new retail firm. With the increased impact of delivery time on market demand, the fixed charges paid by the offline store become smaller. Under the coordination decision model, the offline store pays fixed charges to compensate for the new retail firm’s early delivery costs, but its interests still increase compared with the decentralized decision model. This study models the time-dependent demand for fresh products and proposes an incentive mechanism to coordinate the new retail fresh products’ supply chain; further, it demonstrates that the prices can be significantly decreased with the designed contract, and all the supply chain members can benefit from Pareto improvement.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on Incentive and Coordination Strategy of Fresh Products’ Supply Chain with Delivery Time under New Retail

Zhang

Ding

2023

Systems

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A sustainable supply chain model for time-varying deteriorating items under the promotional cost-sharing policy and three-level trade credit financing

Aliabadi,

Zegordi,

Husseinzadeh Kashan

et al. 2024

Oper Res Int J

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Nash equilibrium in emerging partnership-based Islamic banking industry with a Bayesian game-theoretic approach

Asl

Ghasemoghli

Khalfaoui³

2023

IJOEM

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PurposeA hypothesis developed in this paper models the relationship between the borrower and the bank as a dynamic game based on incomplete information (business game) and seeks an equilibrium point at which the facilitated applicant can act according to the terms of the loan agreement once the contract is signed and meet the requirements of the contract.Design/methodology/approachThe primary assumption in the formation of the Islamic bank in Islamic society is that the members of the society are Muslims and act according to religious orders. However, the non-fulfillment of divine principles and orders is always possible. In partnership agreements, the risk of infringement is reduced and corrupt contracts are prevented in some circumstances. Our basic model was constructed using the Beer-Quiche classic game, which has been modified dynamically along with a generalization of complexity terms. The information asymmetry led us to use a heterogeneous belief system to evaluate the probability of the customer transmitting a low credit risk signal to the bank and the probability of the customer transmitting a high credit risk signal to the bank. There are several assumptions of the basic model that are released in the extended model by the presence of a social inspector, by exploring credit risk signals in the generalized model and by considering various commitment levels in the comprehensive model.FindingsAs a result, it is observed that there is no Nash equilibrium in cases where the customer applies separation strategies. But if the pulling strategies are applied, the Nash equilibrium can be achieved under certain conditions, including inspection bodies in the banking system, the creation of necessary transparency and the proper treatment of criminals by government and regulatory bodies. So, by using alternative belief systems, applying different filters and paying attention to all sectors of the economy, new Nash equilibrium points can be achieved. Moreover, multi-stage facilities payment reduces the risk of corrupt contracts.Originality/valueThis paper sets out to analyze Nash Equilibrium and its possible encounter in Islamic Banking for the first time, utilizing a Bayesian Game-Theoretic framework. A major aspect of the research is the contribution to a better understanding of the role of transparency and government oversight in the implementation of Islamic banking regulatory standards.

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Joint coordination contract for capital‐constrained supply chains under asymmetric information

Cited by 4 publications

References 77 publications

Research on Incentive and Coordination Strategy of Fresh Products’ Supply Chain with Delivery Time under New Retail

Research on Incentive and Coordination Strategy of Fresh Products’ Supply Chain with Delivery Time under New Retail

A sustainable supply chain model for time-varying deteriorating items under the promotional cost-sharing policy and three-level trade credit financing

Nash equilibrium in emerging partnership-based Islamic banking industry with a Bayesian game-theoretic approach

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