Justification and the Truth-Connection

Littlejohn, Clayton

doi:10.1017/cbo9781139060097

Cited by 243 publications

(188 citation statements)

References 175 publications

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“…I do not want to enter into an extended discussion of the merits and demerits of 1 Bird (2004), Hyman (2006), Littlejohn (2012), Unger (1975), and Williamson (2000; defend 2 Turri (2009) coined the term for the view. Davidson (2001: 141) argues that only beliefs can count as a reason for forming a belief.…”

Section: The Focus In This Paper Is On What Evidence Is Not On What mentioning

confidence: 99%

No Evidence is False

Littlejohn

2012

Acta Anal

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URL identifying the publication in the King's Portal: [https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/no-evidence-isfalse(a49e8dcf-4994-477d-96a7-f9149debf4cc).html] 1No evidence is false Clayton Littlejohn Forthcoming in Acta AnalyticaIf evidence is propositional, is one's evidence limited to true propositions or might false propositions constitute evidence? In this paper, I consider three recent attempts to show that there can be 'false evidence' and argue that each of these attempts fails. The evidence for the thesis that evidence consists of truths is much stronger than the evidence offered in support of the theoretical assumptions that people have relied on to argue against this thesis. While I shall not defend the view that evidence is propositional, I shall defend the view that any propositional evidence must be true.

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Section: The Focus In This Paper Is On What Evidence Is Not On What mentioning

confidence: 99%

No Evidence is False

Littlejohn

2012

Acta Anal

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“…Other critics criticize my proposal but (wisely) don't try their hand at specifying what this reason is. 15 While Hyman (1999), Littlejohn (2012), McDowell (1998), Mantel (2013), and Unger (1975) have a non-accidental connection requirement in their accounts of possession, not everyone agrees that this is a genuine desiderata. See Hofman (2014) for discussion.…”

Section: Externalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There's no competition in describing the good case between the fact about the situation and the fact about her mental life. For further discussion of these kinds of points, see Alvarez (2010) and Littlejohn (2012). Some critics think that it's a weakness of this view precisely as Agnes undergoes this experience her brother crosses the stage and accepts his diploma.…”

Section: Externalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For defenses of propositionalism, see Dougherty (2011), Fantl and McGrath (2009), Miller (2008, and Schroeder (2008Schroeder ( , 2011. For defenses of factualism, see Alvarez (2010), Hornsby (2007), Hyman (1999, Littlejohn (2012), Unger (1975), andWilliamson (2000). Most participants to this debate aren't terribly concerned about the relationship between propositions and facts and are happy to say that they think of true propositions as facts.…”

Section: Internalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As I think that some things are known without being based on reasons, I wouldn't want to introduce a norm that requires of each justified belief that it's supported by reasons. 29 For further defenses of the view that knowledge is the fundamental epistemic norm, see Adler (2002), Littlejohn (2013), Sutton (2007), Williamson (2000).…”

Section: Evidence and Justificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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How and Why Knowledge is First

Littlejohn¹

2017

Oxford Scholarship Online

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This chapter’s dialectical aim has, as its focus, a sustained defence of the claim that one cannot have a reason in one’s possession unless it is something that one knows. This view is claimed to have advantages over a different way of thinking about epistemic status. On the ‘reasons-first’ approach to epistemic status, reasons and the possession of them are prior to epistemic status. In reversing this picture, the chapter reveals an important sense in which knowledge comes first—namely, in that we first come to have reasons in our possession by coming to know that certain things are true; there is nothing prior to knowledge that puts these reasons in our possession. In the course of advancing this picture, the chapter furthermore offers a defence of Williamson’s identification of evidence and knowledge (E=K).

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Basic Knowledge and Contextualist “E = K”

Ichikawa

2013

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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Timothy Williamson (2000) makes a strong prima facie case for the identification of a subject's total evidence with the subject's total knowledge (E = K). However, as Brian Weatherson (Ms) has observed, there are intuitively problematic consequences of E = K. In this article, I'll offer a contextualist implementation of E = K that provides the resources to respond to Weatherson's argument; the result will be a novel approach to knowledge and evidence that is suggestive of an unexplored contextualist approach to basic knowledge.

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Justification and the Truth-Connection

Cited by 243 publications

References 175 publications

No Evidence is False

No Evidence is False

How and Why Knowledge is First

Basic Knowledge and Contextualist “E = K”

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