Justification, truth, and coherence

Lehrer, Keith; Cohen, Stewart

doi:10.1007/bf00485068

Cited by 164 publications

(81 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…Such is the case in Cohen and Lehrer's famous New Evil Demon case (Lehrer and Cohen 1983). In this case, victims of the demon have reflective access to exactly the same information as we in our world have.…”

Section: Epistemic Luckmentioning

confidence: 97%

Epistemic justification and epistemic luck

Grefte

2017

Synthese

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Among epistemologists, it is not uncommon to relate various forms of epistemic luck to the vexed debate between internalists and externalists. But there are many internalism/externalism debates in epistemology, and it is not always clear how these debates relate to each other. In the present paper I investigate the relation between epistemic luck and prominent internalist and externalist accounts of epistemic justification. I argue that the dichotomy between internalist and externalist concepts of justification can be characterized in terms of epistemic luck. Whereas externalist theories of justification are incompatible with veritic luck but not with reflective luck, the converse is true for internalist theories of justification. These results are found to explain and cohere with some recent findings from elsewhere in epistemology, and support a surprising picture of justification, on which internalism and externalism are complementary rather than contradictory positions.

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Section: Epistemic Luckmentioning

confidence: 97%

Epistemic justification and epistemic luck

Grefte

2017

Synthese

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“…In particular, in terms of (S 2 1), it would suffice, for example, that one does not-as opposed to the stronger cannot-have a rational basis that favours one's belief that E over the BIV scenario. Relatedly, it would suffice for (S 2 2) that it follows from one's lack of such a favouring rational basis that one lacks rationally grounded knowledge that E. 14 The loci classici as regards the new evil demon intuition are Lehrer and Cohen (1983) and Cohen (1984). I discuss this intuition at length in Pritchard (forthcoming b).…”

Section: Underdetermination-based Radical Scepticismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Contextualism and radical scepticism

Pritchard

2016

Synthese

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A critique of attributer contextualist treatments of the problem of radical scepticism is offered. It is argued that while such proposals, standardly conceived, gain some purchase against the closure-based formulation of this problem, they run aground when applied to the logically distinct underdetermination-based formulation. A specific kind of attributer contextualism-rational support contextualism-is then explored. This is better placed to deal with underdetermination-based radical scepticism via its endorsement of ascriptions of factive rational support in everyday contexts of epistemic appraisal. But such a proposal is faced with a dialectical impasse with regard to the competing epistemological disjunctivist response to radical scepticism. While the former has dialectical advantages over the latter with regard to closurebased radical scepticism, the latter has the dialectical upper-hand when it comes to underdetermination-based radical scepticism. It is claimed that the way to resolve this issue-and thereby to understand that we should not expect a unified treatment of these two formulations of the sceptical problem, much less one that is cast along contextualist lines-is to recognise how these two formulations reflect distinct sources of scepticism.

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“…An analysis analogous to the one given of the Evil Demon Scenario can be given of the New Evil Demon Scenario (Lehrer and Cohen 1983;Cohen 1984). Consider Matt who finds himself entrapped in a matrix.…”

Section: New Evil Demon Scenariomentioning

confidence: 99%

Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence

Schellenberg

2015

Philos Stud

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Perceptions guide our actions and provide us with evidence of the world around us. Illusions and hallucinations can mislead us: they may prompt as to act in ways that do not mesh with the world around us and they may lead us to form false beliefs about that world. The capacity view provides an account of evidence that does justice to these two facts. It shows in virtue of what illusions and hallucinations mislead us and prompt us to act. Moreover, it shows in virtue of what we are in a better epistemic position when we perceive than when we hallucination. In this paper, I develop the capacity view, that is, the view that perceptual experience has epistemic force in virtue of the epistemic and metaphysical primacy of the perceptual capacities employed in perception. By grounding the epistemic force of experience in facts about the metaphysical structure of experience, the capacity view is not only an externalist view, but moreover a naturalistic view of the epistemology of perceptual experience. So it is an externalist and naturalistic alternative to reliabilism. I discuss the repercussions of this view for the justification of beliefs and the epistemic transparency of mental states, as well as, familiar problem cases.

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Justification, truth, and coherence

Cited by 164 publications

References 3 publications

Epistemic justification and epistemic luck

Epistemic justification and epistemic luck

Contextualism and radical scepticism

Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence

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