Knowing How

Stanley, Jason; Willlamson, Timothy

doi:10.2307/2678403

Cited by 848 publications

(556 citation statements)

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“…Thus, according to most anti-intellectualists, practical knowers differ from theoretical knowers by virtue of having an ability that theoretical knowers lack. 4 Intellectualist positions on knowing how have been defended by a number of philosophers, most recently by Stanley (forthcoming), Bengson and Moffett (2007), Snowdon (2004) and Stanley and Williamson (2001). 5 All of these philosophers agree that knowing how is a special kind of knowing that.…”

Section: Knowing How and Armchair Knowledgementioning

confidence: 98%

“…Still, since propositional knowledge is standardly understood as a kind of belief, the intellectualist claim that know how is a species of propositional knowledge is at least misleading. Lack of precision in formulating the view is probably due to intellectualists' fixation on the language we use to ascribe know how and propositional knowledge rather than knowledge itself and the human mind (see, e.g., Stanley and Williamson 2001;Hintikka 1975;Brown 1970). To avoid confusion, it is probably best to understand intellectualism not as a thesis about the assimilation of knowing how to knowing that, but as the thesis that knowing how is a representation with propositional content.…”

Section: Knowing How Knowing That and Abilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

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In support of anti-intellectualism

Kumar

2009

Philos Stud

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Intellectualist theories attempt to assimilate know how to propositional knowledge and, in so doing, fail to properly explain the close relation know how bears to action. I develop here an anti-intellectualist theory that is warranted, I argue, because it best accounts for the difference between know how and mere ''armchair knowledge.'' Know how is a mental state characterized by a certain world-to-mind direction of fit (though it is non-motivational) and attendant functional role. It is essential of know how, but not propositional knowledge, that it makes possible performance errors and has the functional role of guiding action. The theory is attractive, in part, because it allows for propositional, non-propositional and perhaps even non-representational varieties of know how.Keywords Know how Á Propositional knowledge Á Intellectualism Á Direction of fit Á Functional role Á Performance errorsThe recent literature on knowing how is dominated by intellectualism. 1 Most intellectualists subscribe to what is, frankly, a rather unintuitive view: to know how to do something is to know that it can or ought to be performed in a certain way. Resistance to intellectualism can be motivated by appeal to the essential link that know how bears to action, a link that is best captured within an anti-intellectualist model.A theory of knowing how, whether intellectualist or anti-intellectualist, must respect the distinctions we ordinarily draw between those who know how to perform an action and those who merely have ''armchair knowledge'' about how the action is performed. Attending carefully to these distinctions reveals an important and, I believe, essential feature of know how. Knowing how, in contrast with mere ''armchair knowledge,'' has a world-to-mind ''direction of fit'' (similar to but importantly different from the world-to-mind direction of fit of motivational states). The central claim in the paper is that know how is exhaustively characterized by a certain direction of fit and attendant functional role. Knowing how and armchair knowledgeThe most famous discussion of knowing how is somewhat dated, occurring in chapter two of Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind. Recently, however, there has been a renewal of interest in the subject among philosophers. Even those who haven't read the relevant philosophical literature are sure to have some grasp of the concept, mediated by a familiarity with the distinction between knowing how and knowing that. This is the distinction that marks the difference between an artist's knowledge and an art critic's, an athlete's knowledge and an instructor's. The one involves a fittingness for practical engagement with the world, the other a theoretical appreciation of that engagement.One of the most important sources of evidence to which an adequate theory of know how must attend are the cases that provide us with our fundamental grasp of the concept. These cases evince a contrast between practical and theoretical knowers-between, on the one hand, individuals who genuinely know how to perform...

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Section: Knowing How and Armchair Knowledgementioning

confidence: 98%

Section: Knowing How Knowing That and Abilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

In support of anti-intellectualism

Kumar

2009

Philos Stud

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“…However, not everyone agrees that there is a relevant distinction to be made (see, e.g., Stanley and Williamson 2001;Schaffer 2007;Stanley 2011). In particular, Stanley and Williamson (2001) and Stanley (2011) question the distinction and instead argue that knowledge-how is a form of knowledge-that.…”

Section: Induction From a Naturalistic Perspectivementioning

confidence: 99%

“…In particular, Stanley and Williamson (2001) and Stanley (2011) question the distinction and instead argue that knowledge-how is a form of knowledge-that. In the literature, this position is called intellectualism, in contrast to anti-intellectualism as exemplified by Ryle (1949), and for example Stanley (2011) claims that knowledge-how can be analysed as a state with propositional content.…”

Section: Induction From a Naturalistic Perspectivementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Consequently, trying to identify the type of knowledge generated by induction by analysing answers to non-generic wh-questions does not seem to be a fruitful strategy. The intellectualist tradition claims that all forms of knowledge-wh, just as knowledge-how, reduces to declarative knowledge-that (Hintikka 1975;Lewis 1982;Boër and Lycan 1986;Higginbotham 1996;Stanley and Williamson 2001). We instead want to argue that knowledge-what is not directly connected to language but instead to properties and categories.philosophy of science (Hempel 1965;Carroll 2016).…”

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Induction and knowledge-what

Gärdenfors

Stephens

2017

Euro Jnl Phil Sci

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Within analytic philosophy, induction has been seen as a problem concerning inferences that have been analysed as relations between sentences. In this article, we argue that induction does not primarily concern relations between sentences, but between properties and categories. We outline a new approach to induction that is based on two theses. The first thesis is epistemological. We submit that there is not only knowledge-how and knowledge-that, but also knowledge-what. Knowledge-what concerns relations between properties and categories and we argue that it cannot be reduced to knowledge-that. We support the partition of knowledge by mapping it onto the long-term memory systems: procedural, semantic and episodic memory. The second thesis is that the role of inductive reasoning is to generate knowledge-what. We use conceptual spaces to model knowledge-what and the relations between properties and categories involved in induction.

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2011

Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics

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Knowing How

Cited by 848 publications

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In support of anti-intellectualism

In support of anti-intellectualism

Induction and knowledge-what

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