Knowledge and Presuppositions

Blome-Tillmann, Michael

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686087.003.0002

Cited by 18 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 44 publications

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“…PEAK can capture semantic contextualist accounts according to which the truth conditions of ‘knows’ vary with practical matters via their influence on conversational context (Lewis , Blome‐Tillmann ). It may even capture contextualist accounts that are explicitly purist/intellectualist (DeRose ) .…”

Section: Austinian Semantics and Pragmatic Encroachmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…But this directive speech act perspective is perhaps most important because it may help with the notoriously difficult problem of providing a pragmatic account of appropriate knowledge denials in “high‐stakes” cases (DeRose , Iacono , Blome‐Tillmann , Petersen forthcoming ). In such cases, denying knowledge that p can be an appropriate way to recommend against acting on p .…”

Section: Positive Lessonsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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How to Do Things with Knowledge Ascriptions

Gerken

2015

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Section: Austinian Semantics and Pragmatic Encroachmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Positive Lessonsmentioning

confidence: 99%

How to Do Things with Knowledge Ascriptions

Gerken

2015

Philos Phenomenol Research

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“…Contextualism is defended in particular by Cohen (), DeRose (, ), Blome‐Tillmann () and Ichikawa (), and Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism by Hawthorne (), Stanley () and Fantl and McGrath (). A third revisionary proposal is relativism, which is defended by MacFarlane ().…”

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confidence: 99%

Refined Invariantism

Vollet

2020

Theoria

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A certain number of cases suggest that our willingness to ascribe “knowledge” can be influenced by practical factors. For revisionary proposals, they indicate that the truth‐values of “knowledge” ascriptions vary with practical factors. For conservative proposals, on the contrary, nothing surprising is happening. Standard pragmatic approaches appeal to pragmatic implicatures and psychological approaches to the idea that belief formation is influenced by practical factors. Conservative proposals have not yet offered a fully satisfactory explanation, though. In this article, I introduce and defend a third conservative proposal which I call “Refined Invariantism”. The two main claims of this proposal are that (1) we should distinguish between high stakes cases in which the subject does not believe (that he knows) the target proposition and those in which he believes (that he knows) the target proposition and that (2) we should adopt a psychological treatment for the first kind of case and a pragmatic treatment based on the epistemic standards for appropriate assertion and action for the second kind of case. I argue that this new combined approach avoids the main pitfalls of its two conservative rivals and that it gives new life to the generality objection levelled against revisionary views.

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“…For this reason, I have included the epistemological views proposed by the contextualist as a type of pragmatism. See Cohen (), DeRose (), and Blome‐Tillmann () for contextualist accounts of knowledge.…”

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confidence: 99%

Pragmatic encroachment in epistemology

Kim

2017

Philosophy Compass

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Epistemology orthodoxy is a purist one in the sense that it separates out the epistemic from the practical. What counts as evidence is independent of what we care about. Which beliefs count as justified and which count as knowledge are independent of our practical concerns. In recent years, many epistemologists have abandoned such purist views and embraced varying degrees of pragmatic encroachment on the epistemic. I survey a variety of these views and explore the main arguments that proponents of pragmatic encroachment have offered in addition to the main criticisms of the pragmatic approach. | INTRODUCTIONAccording to philosophical lore, epistemological orthodoxy is a purist epistemology in which epistemic concepts are characterized to be pure and free from practical concerns. On this purist view, what counts as knowledge, for example, is independent of what we care about, and what is good or bad for us is independent of what we have evidence to believe or accept. So one is a purist to the extent that one believes that the epistemic realm is independent of the practical realm and that our epistemic concepts are independent from our practical ones. 1In recent years, a number of challenges have been posed against purism from proponents of pragmatic encroachment, who adhere to the slogan that the practical encroaches on the epistemic. 2 Let us call any view that adheres to this slogan pragmatic. Since proponents of pragmatic encroachment represent a variety of philosophical approaches and views, the slogan is purposely ambiguous, open to a variety of interpretations and applications. I shall, however, begin our discussion by focusing on one specific interpretation. Once we have done so, we can then raise questions about how we have interpreted the slogan and explore alternatives that widen and/or change the scope of the slogan's application. I will do so by offering a taxonomy of pragmatic views in section 4.We start by specifying what we mean by "the practical" by appealing to a demarcation of practical from nonpractical factors that corresponds with the demarcation between non-truth-relevant and truth-relevant factors.Relative to some proposition p, a factor is truth-relevant just in case it affects the likelihood that p is true or false.So anything that raises or lowers the objective or subjective probability that p counts as truth-relevant. 3 For example, relative to the proposition that it will rain today, any proposition q (e.g., that there are clouds in the sky) such that the conditional probability that it will rain today given q is not equal to the unconditional probability that it will rain today will count as truth-relevant. On this initial interpretation, practical factors are just nontruthrelevant factors. 4Next, since knowledge is often taken as the central object of theoretical concern for epistemology, the most widely discussed question about pragmatic encroachment is the question of whether or not practical factors are

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Knowledge and Presuppositions

Cited by 18 publications

References 44 publications

How to Do Things with Knowledge Ascriptions

How to Do Things with Knowledge Ascriptions

Refined Invariantism

Pragmatic encroachment in epistemology

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