Knowledge dilemmas within organizations: Resolutions from game theory

Sharma, Ravi S.; Bhattacharya, Suman

doi:10.1016/j.knosys.2013.02.011

Cited by 30 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 75 publications

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“…Several studies have identified the game theory as an appropriate problem framing technique that would provide useful insights (Mueller et al 2005 ; Sharma and Bhattacharya 2013 ; Liu et al 2019 ). The rational action theory explains how the players in a game are guided by their perception of utility.…”

Section: Experimenting With the Knowledge Sharing Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Knowledge Sharing Framework: a Game-Theoretic Approach

Al-Gharaibeh

Ali

2021

J Knowl Econ

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Uncertainty in business environments is promoting learning as an organizational value. Organizations need to implement knowledge management (KM) processes as well as organizational mechanisms transforming collective knowledge into a learning organizational capability. Literature identifies knowledge sharing (KS) as a fundamental KM process. Moreover, KM was found to be a prerequisite to a learning organization. Unfortunately, organizational initiatives promoting KS are challenged with the hoarding wisdom, "knowledge is power." Literature has researched intrinsic and extrinsic motivations affecting KS intention. The rational action theory (RAT) explains the embedded utility function merging these motivations. Despite many studies, the dynamics of KS behavior needs further examination. This paper is an attempt to frame the KS behavior using game theory and RAT. We represent individuals' perceived utility in two functions: knowledge and trustworthiness. This limits the perceived utility to personal enjoyment and reciprocity, which could be viewed as establishing a baseline KS behavior. We use the assurance game framework to incubate the two utility functions. Finally, we argue that KS intention is actually a dynamic state within a KS strategy. We identify five KS strategies: cooperation, defection, tit-for-tat, unforgiving, and random. It is the performance of these strategies that needs to be studied. Several scenarios are simulated to observe the progression of knowledge within each strategy. Interestingly, two strategies start with positive KS intention yet end up converging with those who started with negative KS intention. On the long run, only cooperatives seem to be contributing to collective knowledge. Empirical data from a teaching hospital is collected and analyzed for comparison.

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Section: Experimenting With the Knowledge Sharing Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Knowledge Sharing Framework: a Game-Theoretic Approach

Al-Gharaibeh

Ali

2021

J Knowl Econ

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“…Let's mark: With the help of game theory models it is possible to determine the optimal decisions about the pricing policy for new products, plans to capture new markets, cooperation of enterprises, the distribution of project work, etc. [24]. Thus, the provisions of game theory can be used for all types of decisions, if their adoption is influenced by other actors.…”

Section: Tablementioning

confidence: 99%

Management of Stakeholders in Transport System Development Projects Considering the Possible Communication Conflicts

Malyeyeva

Литвиненко

Artiukh³

2020

Intelligent Computer-Integrated Information Technology in Project and Program Management

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“…In the field of Management, game theory has been frequently used to study cooperative scenarios. Considering cooperative studies, game theory has contributed to exploring the issues of cooperative strategies (Winckler & Molinari, 2011), organizational dilemmas (Sharma & Bhattacharya, 2013), and issues regarding organizational behavior and cooperative strategies for generating innovation (De Melo & Câ mara, 2008;Ozkan-Canbolat & Beraha, 2016).…”

Section: Game Theory Collaborative Behavior and Innovation Networkmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Management of Innovation Networks: Possibilities of Collaboration in Light of Game Theory

Câmara

Buarque

Mota

et al. 2018

BMS

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The purpose of the present article is to demonstrate how understanding the rationality of the agents of innovation networks can be useful to strategically formulate their management, in light of the prisoner's dilemma. This research was undertaken using a theoretical test that addresses the topics of network governance and management, collaboration and game theory. The results may contribute to the literature on network governance and management, more specifically to the field of innovation networks, by proposing scenarios upon which network managers can build in order to develop governance strategies. Moreover, management mechanisms are also proposed, adjusted to the innovation networks, in order to encourage collaboration among the participants of these innovative environments.

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Knowledge dilemmas within organizations: Resolutions from game theory

Cited by 30 publications

References 75 publications

Knowledge Sharing Framework: a Game-Theoretic Approach

Knowledge Sharing Framework: a Game-Theoretic Approach

Management of Stakeholders in Transport System Development Projects Considering the Possible Communication Conflicts

The Management of Innovation Networks: Possibilities of Collaboration in Light of Game Theory

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