Leaf Traits and Resource Use Efficiencies of 19 Woody Plant Species in a Plantation in Fangshan, Beijing, China

Zhong, Guowei; Tian, Yun; Liu, Peng; Jia, Xin; Zha, Tianshan

doi:10.3390/f14010063

Cited by 8 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 55 publications

(62 reference statements)

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“…The existing conditions and calculation methods make it difficult to determine whether the aforesaid 8 equilibrium points are the evolutionary stability strategy, which indicates that it is not clear whether there are equilibrium points in the evolutionary game system. System dynamics can analyze the complex dynamic evolution process of evolutionary game models under the conditions of bounded rationality and asymmetric information [ 17 ], and can explore and reveal the potential mechanism of problems and seek key strategies to solve problems [ 18 ]. Therefore, we further use the system dynamics tool to simulate the impact of uncertainty factors on the stability of the evolutionary game system, so as to provide decision-making reference for formulating relevant policies and optimizing the dynamic mechanism of EHRs integration.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Vertical Integration of Electronic Health Records in Medical Consortiums: Dynamic Modeling Approach Based on the Evolutionary Game Theory

Tian

Chen

2023

JMIR Serious Games

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Background China has continuously issued policies to speed up the interconnection, mutual recognition, sharing of medical information systems, and data integration management across regions and institutions. However, the vertical integration of electronic health records (EHRs) within the medical consortium is hampered by “poor mechanism and insufficient motivation” and the phenomenon of “free riding” among participating medical institutions, which makes the integration less effective. Objective We hope to clarify the game mechanism of stakeholders in the vertical integration of EHRs, and put forward targeted policy suggestions for improvement. Methods We constructed the “government-hospital-patient” tripartite evolutionary game model based on the detailed analysis of the research problems and their assumptions. We then simulated the game strategies and outcomes of each participant using the system dynamics approach to reveal the long-term strategy evolution mechanism of the core participants in the vertical integration of EHRs in the medical consortium, as well as the influencing factors and action mechanisms of each party’s strategy evolution to provide references for improving relevant policies. Results The evolutionary game system could eventually reach an optimal equilibrium, but in areas where the government was required to be in a dominant position, patient supervision was necessary to have a positive role, while a reasonable reward and punishment mechanism can promote active participation of hospitals. Conclusions The effective way to achieve the goal of vertical integration of EHRs in the medical consortium is to build a multiagent coordination mechanism under the guidance of the government. Meanwhile, it is necessary to establish a scientific integration performance evaluation mechanism, a reward and punishment mechanism, and a benefit distribution mechanism to promote the healthy development of vertical integration of EHRs in medical consortiums.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%