“…The Vietnam War is often thought of as the archetypal case of naive and arrogant quantitative analysis run amok (Chomsky 1968). In fact, Stanford's Jeremy Milstein was already using predictions derived from his regression analyses in 1968 to suggest that the USA's bombing campaign would fail to prevent further North Vietnamese incursions into the South, and that the commitment of further US ground troops to South Vietnam would not bolster confidence in the South Vietnamese regime (Milstein 1974;Milstein and Mitchell 1968;Ward et al 2013). Moving forward in time, Caulkins, Kleiman, and Kulick's (2010) deductive microeconomic model of the Afghan drug trade allowed them to forecast that global production of opiates would remain concentrated in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future; that eradication efforts would serve simultaneously to make the trade more profitable and to concentrate it in Taliban-run areas; and, most shockingly, that alternative livelihood programs would end up funding the insurgency through de facto taxes levied by the Taliban on local farmers.…”