Legislative-Executive Relations and Legislative Oversight

Rockman, Bert A.

doi:10.2307/439490

Cited by 49 publications

(48 citation statements)

References 66 publications

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“…However, as Ogul and Rockman (1990) and Rockman (1984) noted, there is much greater variety as to how oversight can be defined, and definitions of oversight range from minimalistic to all-encompassing. 4.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…Effective oversight, they observe, depends not only on the availability of mechanisms, but also on several additional conditions. These conditions include whether the parliament has the ability to modify legislation (Loewenberg and Patterson 1979), whether parliaments and parliamentarians are given proper information to perform their oversight tasks adequately (Frantzich 1979;Jewell 1978), swings in the political mood of the country (Ogul and Rockman 1990), tensions between the executive and the legislature, the saliency of issues, and how aggressively the opposition performs its role (Maor 1999;Rockman 1984). A key question remains: Does legislative oversight help curb corruption?…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…They emphasize that legislatures may adopt several tools for this purpose, such as hearings in committees, hearings in the plenary assembly, inquiry committees, parliamentary questions, question time, interpellations, and an ombudsman (Maffio 2002;Pennings 2000). Others have noted, however, that oversight tools are a necessary but insufficient condition for effective oversight, because effective oversight depends not only on the availability of tools, but also on additional conditions, such as the oversight powers given to the parliament, whether the parliament is able to modify legislation (Loewenberg and Patterson 1979), whether parliament and parliamentarians are given proper information to perform their oversight tasks adequately (Frantzich 1979), and the role of individual MPs and committee chairs, the saliency of issues, and how aggressively the opposition performs its role (Rockman 1984).…”

Section: • Public Integrity Summer 2014mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Corruption and Legislatures

Stapenhurst

Jacobs

Pelizzo³

2014

Public Integrity

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The control of corruption is an important element of governance and a stated goal of many governments. Legislative oversight is an acknowledged mechanism for controlling corruption, but little research has been undertaken on this subject, and national anticorruption strategies generally ignore the legislature. This article addresses the question of whether legislative oversight helps to curb perceived corruption, and if so, how. Statistical analysis using data from a global survey of 82 legislatures found that the presence of legislative oversight tools explains a major proportion of the variance in perceived levels of wrongdoing in countries with presidential forms of government, but much less in countries with semipresidential governments and less yet again in parliamentary systems. The analysis also found that the effectiveness of legislative oversight instruments varies by form of government. In presidential countries the most important instruments are committee hearings, hearings in plenary, and ombuds offices; in semipresidential countries they are question time, interpellations, and ombuds, while in parliamentary systems interpellations are the most important. These findings demonstrate that while the oversight apparatus is useful in helping curb malfeasance, not all tools are equally effective, and what works for some forms of government may not work as well, or at all, in other systems. Clearly, the "one size fits all" approach is inadequate when it comes to legislative corruption control.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Section: • Public Integrity Summer 2014mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Corruption and Legislatures

Stapenhurst

Jacobs

Pelizzo³

2014

Public Integrity

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“…Effective oversight may depend on the specific oversight powers given to the parliament, on whether the parliament has the ability to modify legislation (Loewenberg & Patterson, 1979), on whether parliaments and parliamentarians are given proper information to perform their oversight tasks adequately (Frantzich, 1979), on the role of individual MPs, on the role of committee chairs, on the saliency of issues, and on how aggressively the opposition performs its role (Rockman, 1984).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Public Accounts Committees in the Commonwealth: oversight, effectiveness, and governance

Pelizzo

2011

Commonwealth & Comparative Politics

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The World Bank, Consultant on Legislative AffairsFor the past 15 years the international community has assumed that by strengthening legislative capacity, legislatures are better equipped to oversee government activity and spending, to keep governments accountable, to secure good governance, prevent corruption, and create the conditions for sustainable economic development. The purpose of the present paper is to test this set of assumptions by focusing on one of the oversight tools that the international community regards as particularly important, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC). Structural and organisational features that affect the performance of PACs is analysed, the relationship between oversight activity and effectiveness is investigated, and it is assessed whether good governance is a function of oversight activity, of effectiveness or of both. The analyses reveal that while oversight activity does not always have a significant or directly positive impact on good governance, good governance is indeed a function of oversight effectiveness as the international community had long assumed.

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“…In the following century this challenge occupied the minds of social scientists on both sides of the Atlantic, although maybe not to the extent wished by Weber and Wilson (Rockman, 1984;Ogul and Rockman, 1990). However, the last 10-15 years have seen a renewed interest in delegation studies.…”

Section: A Delegation Perspective On Comitologymentioning

confidence: 96%

The EU Comitology System in Theory and Practice

Blom‐Hansen¹

2011

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Legislative-Executive Relations and Legislative Oversight

Cited by 49 publications

References 66 publications

Corruption and Legislatures

Corruption and Legislatures

Public Accounts Committees in the Commonwealth: oversight, effectiveness, and governance

The EU Comitology System in Theory and Practice

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