Logic as a Science and Logic as a Theory: Remarks on Frege, Russell and the Logocentric Predicament

Korhonen, Anssi

doi:10.1007/s11787-012-0057-6

Cited by 7 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…The claim that Frege is prevented from engaging in logical metatheory is contested by Stanley (1996), Tappenden (1997), andHeck (2007); on this see the response by Weiner (2005). Scholars who argue that not all aspects of the universalist conception of logic are attributable to Russell include Proops (2007) (who nonetheless makes clear that some of these aspects are present in Russell's earlier texts, especially the Principles of Mathematics) as well as Korhonen (2012) and Blanchette (2013). I discuss some further points made by Proops in footnote 13.…”

Section: Whose Views Are Targeted By the Reductio?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Wittgenstein's Reductio

Nir

2022

JHAP

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By means of a reductio argument, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus calls into question the very idea that we can represent logical form. My paper addresses three interrelated questions: first, what conception of logical form is at issue in this argument? Second, whose conception of logic is this argument intended to undermine? And third, what could count as an adequate response to it? I show that the argument construes logical form as the universal, underlying correlation of any representation and the reality it represents. I further show that the argument seeks to undermine core commitments of Frege’s and Russell’s. But the reductio, as I read it, is not intended to establish the falsity of any of their specific assumptions. Rather, its aim is to make manifest the indeterminacies that underlie the language in which these assumptions are framed, and establish the need for a transformation of that language. So understood, Wittgenstein’s argument exemplifies his idea that philosophy is not a theory, but an activity of elucidation. The interpretation I propose bears on one of the central debates in the literature, namely how we should understand Wittgenstein’s contention that his elucidations succeed despite being nonsensical.

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Section: Whose Views Are Targeted By the Reductio?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Wittgenstein's Reductio

Nir

2022

JHAP

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“…17. See Korhonen (2012) for an extensive discussion of the relevance of this question for Frege and for Russell. 18.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Russell’s Method of Analysis and the Axioms of Mathematics

Patton

2017

Innovations in the History of Analytical Philosophy

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The mathematician is only strong and true as long as he is logical, and if number rules the world, it is logic which rules number.-William Stanley Jevons, Principles of Science (1874). 1 Mathematical Axioms and the Logocentric Predicament Bertrand Russell's approach in Principia Mathematica and elsewhere often is taken as definitive of logicism, or even of "Frege-Russell logicism." According to the logicist approach, mathematics can be (and ought to be) derived from logic, using inferences governed by logical laws. With Frege, Russell distinguished logical laws from the laws of thought and from psychology generally, which distinguishes logicism

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Groundbreaking Principles

Frápolli

2023

Synthese Library

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Logic as a Science and Logic as a Theory: Remarks on Frege, Russell and the Logocentric Predicament

Cited by 7 publications

References 15 publications

Wittgenstein's Reductio

Wittgenstein's Reductio

Russell’s Method of Analysis and the Axioms of Mathematics

Groundbreaking Principles

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