Longitudinal and cross-cultural validation of the belief-discrepancy reasoning construct.

Abstract

Two studies were undertaken to validate the construct of belief-<iiscrepancy reasoning, or the judgments people make about others who disagree with them. In Study 1, 83 first, fourth, seventh, and tenth graders were assessed and then retested 1 year later. Longitudinal trends were significant The trends supported a four-stage sequence of Level 0 (not understanding that one can judge a disagreeing other), Level 1 (intolerance toward the other), Level 2 (total open-mindedness toward the other), and Level 3 (a willingness to judge the other as good or bad with more information about the other's belief). There was a faster rate of growth for the children (Grades 1, 4) than for the adolescents (Grades 7, 10). In Study 2, 34 fourth and seventh graders from Kinshasa, Zaire, were administered the belief-discrepancy scale. There were significant differences between the grades favoring the seventh graders. Implications for belief-discrepancy reasoning development are discussed.

Tolerance of Muslim beliefs and practices: Age related differences and context effects

“…Age, gender, education, and religiousness Enright and Lapsley (1981) have described a developmental progression from a generally intolerant attitude during the childhood years through to increasingly tolerant judgments during adolescence (see also Enright et al, 1984). The sequence they proposed runs parallel with changes in perspective-taking and Kohlberg's stages of moral development (see Berti, 2005).…”

“…The theoretical implication is that the social-cognitive domain model (see Killen, Margie, & Sinno, 2006;Smetana, 1995;Turiel, 2002) seems more adequate for understanding the development of tolerance than a cognitive developmental framework that proposes increasingly advanced stages of tolerance (e.g., Enright & Lapsley, 1981;Enright, Lapsley, Franklin, & Streuck, 1984). The domain model emphasizes that children and adolescents apply different domains of knowledge in their social reasoning and judgments.…”

Tolerance and Intolerance: Children's and Adolescents' Judgments of Dissenting Beliefs, Speech, Persons, and Conduct

“…The little developmental research and theorizing that exists has focused on a single dimension of tolerance, namely, judgments about the personal worth of dissenting individuals. In a series of studies (Enright & Lapsley, 1981;Enright, Lapsley, Franklin, & Steuck, 1984), children and adolescents were asked to give their opinion about certain issues and were subsequently asked to judge a hypothetical person who allegedly took the opposite stand. The issues about which dissenting opinions were sampled in those studies were diverse, and included decisions regarding conflicts between different kinds of considerations or goals (e.g., keeping a prize or returning it to the person who has a prior claim to it; obeying a teacher or helping a friend; allowing the American Nazi party to hold a march in a predominantly Jewish community or protecting the community from potential harm and offense).…”

The Othello Effect

“…While years ear lier they already recognized the dangers of missing the informational boat entirely, what they were not previously prepared to acknowledge, and what they now come to appreciate more clearly, is that the process of inquiry can suffer worse fates than being left entirely in the dark. Beyond the possibility of complete informational eclipse, there arises for such children the potentially more damaging prospect of being only partially informed and consequently seriously mis guided [Enright et al, 1984], In the short run, people who are more and less ade quately informed are expected by these chil dren to disagree. From this perspective, what is inconceivable, however, is that two per sons with the same facts could hold two dif ferent views or that two persons with differ ent opinions about the same reality could both eventually prove to be right.…”

“…However, none of these possibilities is understood by children of such tender years to offer any serious challenge to the ultimate possibility of knowing reality with absolute certainty [Enright et al, 1984], Truth, in this view, is understood to be automatically there for the taking by all who are privy to even its most remote detail [Taylor, 1985]. Theoretical doubt, or at least the kind of dubiousness that might threaten in any way to undermine the actual foundations of the knowledge en terprise, simply has no place in this early childhood world .…”