Low Discounting Behavior among Small-Scale Fishers in Fiji and Sabah, Malaysia

Teh, Louise; Teh, Lydia C. L.; Sumaila, U. Rashid

doi:10.3390/su3060897

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…Their use of a very low discount rate attaches importance to the long-term benefits and creates a willingness to incur larger upfront change costs. This is consistent with findings from elsewhere in the Pacific (Teh et al 2011). The pursuit of rights to manage local resources is also congruent with historical marine tenure regimes in Hawai'i that devolved management to local and regional scales (Beamer 2014;Gonschor and Beamer 2014).…”

Section: Accrual Of Costs and Benefits Over Timesupporting

confidence: 77%

Making the transition to co-management governance arrangements in Hawai‘i: a framework for understanding transaction and transformation costs

et al. 2017

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Co-management has shown great promise in achieving social and ecological goals worldwide. Despite its potential, significant challenges are faced during governance transformations shifting from traditional approaches to fisheries management to co-management systems. Several factors make Hawai'i an excellent opportunity to study the barriers associated with implementing co-management systems. Hawai'i implements many of the same types of regulatory and fisheries programs found elsewhere in the U.S., yet it also possesses a unique legacy of customary management systems. In addition, a legal pathway has existed for nearly two decades that allows communities to partner with the State of Hawai'i to co-manage nearshore coral reef fisheries. Despite the presence of this enabling legislation, extensive community interest in this approach across the archipelago, and A framework for understanding transaction and transformation costs 389 significant NGO/Foundation support, co-management implementation remains limited. This study uses a mixed methods approach that relies on semi-structured interviews and archival data sources to conduct an institutional analysis of transaction and transformation costs. These costs serve as barriers to co-management implementation. The study identifies several social and organizational barriers preventing co-management implementation including: governmental structure and operations; planning and administrative processes; organized opposition from special interests; and consensus building processes. The institutional analysis further reveals a wide range of transaction and transformation costs associated with this governance transformation that prevent adoption of co-management. We conclude by identifying some actions that can help reduce these implementation barriers to co-management transitions and prevent conservation stalemates.Keywords: Co-management, common pool resources, community-based management, coral reefs, fisheries management, governance, institutional analysis, transaction costs Acknowledgements: The authors would like to thank the interview respondents and practitioners that graciously shared their time and valuable experience with us. We would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers that provided valuable comments and insight on earlier versions of this manuscript.

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Section: Accrual Of Costs and Benefits Over Timesupporting

confidence: 77%

Making the transition to co-management governance arrangements in Hawai‘i: a framework for understanding transaction and transformation costs

et al. 2017

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“…An iterative process helps to communicate the potential benefits and impacts of reserves to fishing communities (Leisher et al 2012). Fisher surveys would help to narrow the uncertainty on fishers preferences for short-term costs versus long-term benefits, which is context dependent (Teh et al 2011). Updated discount rates can then be used to more accurately quantify trade-offs between fishers preferences and goals for long-term recovery and ultimately generate more acceptable reserve proposals to fishers.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Minimizing the Short‐Term Impacts of Marine Reserves on Fisheries While Meeting Long‐Term Goals for Recovery

Brown

Abdullah

Mumby

2014

CONSERVATION LETTERS

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Marine reserves are a promising tool for recovering overfished ecosystems. However, reserves designed to rebuild profits in the long-term may cause short-term losses-a serious issue in regions where fisheries are key for food security. We examine the tension between the long-term benefits of reserves and short-term losses, using a multispecies model of coral reef fisheries. Reserves designed to maximize long-term profits caused significant short-term losses. We model several policy solutions, where we incrementally increased either: the number of months per year that the reserve is closed to fishing; the size of the reserve; or the number species protected within the reserve. Protecting species sequentially, starting with the most valued species, provided the best outcome in the short-term with the most rapid recovery of profits. Solving the dilemma of meeting short-and long-term goals will ultimately improve the effectiveness of marine reserves for managing fisheries and conserving ecosystems.

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“…In fisheries, scholars have used economic field experiments to explore different factors such as communication, impatience, reciprocity, rules, and regulations affecting the likelihood of successful cooperation in the management of CPRs (Aswani et al, 2013;Castillo et al, 2011;Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2011;Lopez et al, 2012;Teh et al, 2011;Vélez and Lopez, 2013;Vélez et al, 2009Vélez et al, , 2012.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

External validity of artefactual field experiments: A study on cooperation, impatience and sustainability in an artisanal fishery in Colombia

Torres-Guevara

Schlüter

2016

Ecological Economics

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This paper contributes to the experimental analysis of sustainable behavior in artisanal fisheries and the external validity of economic experiments. We run a standard one-shot public goods experiment and two time preferences experiments with fishermen from Tasajera. It is a small fishing community located in the Caribbean coast of Colombia, which depends mainly on the fishery resources of the Ciénaga Grande de Santa Marta for its livelihood. To investigate the external validity of the experiments, we related the fishermen's individual decisions in the experiments to some indices measuring the ecological impact of fishing activities among the same group of fishermen. We found that fishermen's contributions to the public good and their levels of impatience are not robustly correlated to their real fishing behavior. We argue that the link between fishermen's behavior in the field experiments and real life could be associated to various factors, such as the specific context in which fishermen live, and the way in which cooperation in real life is measured.

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Low Discounting Behavior among Small-Scale Fishers in Fiji and Sabah, Malaysia

Cited by 5 publications

References 40 publications

Making the transition to co-management governance arrangements in Hawai‘i: a framework for understanding transaction and transformation costs

Making the transition to co-management governance arrangements in Hawai‘i: a framework for understanding transaction and transformation costs

Minimizing the Short‐Term Impacts of Marine Reserves on Fisheries While Meeting Long‐Term Goals for Recovery

External validity of artefactual field experiments: A study on cooperation, impatience and sustainability in an artisanal fishery in Colombia

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