Market Structure and Equilibrium

Stackelberg, Heinrich von

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-12586-7

Cited by 266 publications

(120 citation statements)

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“…Accordingly, the player moving first in the order is called the Stackelberg leader, otherwise the follower. For details of the above definition and interpretation of the Stackelberg game, one may refer to [46][47][48].…”

Section: The Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Game Theoretic Analysis of Carbon Emission Abatement in Fashion Supply Chains Considering Vertical Incentives and Channel Structures

Zhao

Lei

2015

Sustainability

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Abstract:We study an emission-dependent dyadic fashion supply chain made up of a supplier and a manufacturer, both of which can reduce their own component/product emissions to serve the carbon-footprint sensitive consumers. With Carbon Tax regulation, we consider four scenarios resulting from two ways in form of adopting transfer price contract and/or introducing third-party emission-reduction service (TPERS) to enhance the efficiency of systematic emission reductions. We refine four models from these corresponding scenarios, which in turn constitute a decision-making framework composed of determining vertical incentives and choosing supply chain structures. By exploiting Stackelberg games in all models, we compare their emission reduction efficiencies and profitability for each pair of settings. Theoretic analysis and numerical studies show that adopting vertical transfer payment schemes can definitely benefit channel carbon footprint reduction and Pareto improvement of supply chain profitability, regardless of whether the emissionreduction service exists or not. However, whether introducing TPERS or not is heavily depending on systematic parameters when the transfer payment incentive is adopted there. We also provide insights on the sensitivity of carbon tax parameters with respect to the supply chain performance, overall carbon emission reduction, vertical incentive and TPERS adopting decision-makings. OPEN ACCESSSustainability 2015, 7 4281

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Section: The Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Game Theoretic Analysis of Carbon Emission Abatement in Fashion Supply Chains Considering Vertical Incentives and Channel Structures

Zhao

Lei

2015

Sustainability

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“…De lo anterior se concluye que, en presencia de bienes homogéneos, la participación del ente integrado es igual a la suma de las participaciones de las intervinientes, que implica sobreestimar la participación de dicha empresa si existe un comportamiento estratégico por parte de cada una de las empresas. O lo que es equivalente, se tiende a subestimar el efecto real que una operación de integración produce en los precios cuando las firmas actúan estratégicamente: [14] ESCENARIO 2: MERCADO DE FIRMAS CON TECNOLOGÍAS HETEROGÉNEAS Después de haber analizado el caso de la homogeneidad entre las tecnologías de las firmas, resulta importante indagar el efecto que sobre el precio se produce cuando interactúan en una estructura oligopólica ciertas firmas cuyos costos y tecnologías resultan disímiles. En este caso, el problema de la firma i será: [15] La condición de primer orden será:…”

Section: Síntesis De Resultados Del Modelounclassified

“…Los esfuerzos de modelación se hicieron progresivamente más visibles durante los albores del siglo XX, a partir de trabajos como el de Chamberlin (1933) y von Stackelberg (1934), quienes refuerzan esta tendencia de modelación.…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

Efectos de integraciones de firmas en mercados de bienes homogéneos

Saavedra¹,

Navarro²

2016

rev.finanz.polit.econ

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Efectos de integraciones de firmas en mercados de bienes homogéneos * 1 RESUMENEste artículo modela los posibles efectos que, ante una integración empresarial, se pueden producir sobre el precio de un mercado de un bien homogéneo. El análisis se realiza a partir de dos escenarios: a) considerando tecnologías similares entre firmas y b) asumiendo algún grado de heterogeneidad por grupos de empresas. Se encuentra que aun en presencia de operaciones en favor de la eficiencia en la oferta del producto, existen riesgos de incremento en precios.Palabras clave: oligopolio, Cournot, bienes homogéneos, comportamiento de las firmas, producción, juegos no cooperativos. JEL: D43, D21, D24, C72The effects of firm mergers on homogenous goods markets ABSTRACT This article models the potential effects of firm mergers on the price of a market for homogenous goods. The analysis is carried out according to two scenarios: a) firms have similar levels of technology at their disposal and b) a degree of heterogeneity is assumed between groups of firms. It is found that even when mechanisms are in place to favor efficiency in product supply, there is a risk that prices will increase.

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“…The Stackelberg game was developed by Heinrich von Stackelberg, being applied originally in the oligopolistic competition (see, f. e. [von Stackelberg, 2011]), based on which the firms define the amount of a homogeneous product to be put on the market hierarchically over an established period of time [Bagchi, 1984;Gibbons, 1992]. This sequential structure has an important effect on the definition of equilibrium of the Stackelberg game.…”

Section: Theoretical Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

Extended Warranty: An Approach via Stackelberg Game

Santos

Cristino

Guedes

2017

RMJ

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bThis paper aims at showing how the game theory can be applied to the quantitative study of extended warranty (EW). This kind of after-sales service represents an additional noncompulsory coverage, which the consumer can or not buy after the acquisition of some device, starting subsequently to the end of the base warranty (BW) period. Thus, a model, in which two players interact, is shown, i. e. the original equipment manufacturer (OEM), in charge of assigning prices to the equipment and to the extended warranty service; and the customer (owner of the device). The way, in which the parts interact, is modeled through the Stackelberg leadership game, which was originally applied in the analysis of the oligopolies competition market. In this particular model, the leader represents the OEM and the follower is the customer, where the OEM's goal is to find a certain price structure to maximize his profit and consequently influence the buyer's decision. Through this adaptation, the strategies and payoffs of players are defined. The robustness of the model is due to incorporating elements of the economic theory (consumer's surplus, producer's surplus, consumer's reservation price, choice under uncertainty, maximum profit and contingent consumption plan) and elements of the reliability theory (probability of failure and non-repairable systems). Additionally, a numerical example and a sensitivity analysis of parameters are presented to highlight the model. Finally, this research systematizes the steps of Stackelberg game under the modeling of extended warranty (EW) as well.

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Market Structure and Equilibrium

Abstract: The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.

Cited by 266 publications

References 0 publications

Game Theoretic Analysis of Carbon Emission Abatement in Fashion Supply Chains Considering Vertical Incentives and Channel Structures

Game Theoretic Analysis of Carbon Emission Abatement in Fashion Supply Chains Considering Vertical Incentives and Channel Structures

Efectos de integraciones de firmas en mercados de bienes homogéneos

Extended Warranty: An Approach via Stackelberg Game

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