Mechanism performance under strategy advice and sub-optimal play: A school choice experiment

Koutout, Kristine; Dustan, Andrew; Linden, Martin Van der; Wooders, Myrna

doi:10.1016/j.socec.2021.101755

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…The vast majority of college admissions in the United Kingdom are organized by the "Universities and Colleges 5 For recent reviews of this literature, see Hakimov and Kübler (2020), Chen et al (2020), or Rees-Jones and Shorrer (2023). 6 See Featherstone and Niederle (2016); Guillen andHakimov (2017) and; Ding and Schotter (2017); Basteck and Mantovani (2018); Li (2017); or Koutout et al (2021). 7 See Hassidim et al (2021); Rees-Jones (2018); Rees-Jones and Skowronek (2018); and Shorrer and Sóvágó (2018).…”

Section: Motivating Matching Environmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Correlation Neglect in Student-to-School Matching

Rees-Jones,

Shorrer,

Tergiman

2024

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

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We present results from three experiments containing incentivized school choice scenarios. In these scenarios, we vary whether schools’ assessments of students are based on a common priority (inducing correlation in admissions decisions) or are based on independent assessments (eliminating correlation in admissions decisions). The quality of students’ application strategies declines in the presence of correlated admissions: application strategies become substantially more aggressive and fail to include attractive “safety” options. We provide a battery of tests suggesting that this phenomenon is at least partially driven by correlation neglect, and we discuss implications for the design and deployment of student-to-school matching mechanisms. (JEL C78, C91, D82, I23)

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Section: Motivating Matching Environmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Correlation Neglect in Student-to-School Matching

Rees-Jones,

Shorrer,

Tergiman

2024

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

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“…5 For a recent reviews of this literature, see Hakimov and Kübler (2020) or Chen et al (2020). 6 See Featherstone and Niederle (2016); Guillen andHakimov (2017) and; Ding and Schotter (2017); Basteck and Mantovani (2018); Li (2017); or Koutout et al (2018). 7 See Hassidim et al (2021); Rees-Jones (2018); Rees-Jones and Skowronek (2018); and Shorrer and Sóvágó (2018).…”

Section: Motivating Matching Environmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Correlation Neglect in Student-to-School Matching

Shorrer

Tergiman

2019

SSRN Journal

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“…5 For a recent reviews of this literature, see Hakimov and Kübler (2020) or Chen et al (2020). 6 See Featherstone and Niederle (2016); Guillen andHakimov (2017) and; Ding and Schotter (2017); Basteck and Mantovani (2018); Li (2017); or Koutout et al (2021). 7 See Hassidim et al (2021); Rees-Jones (2018); Rees-Jones and Skowronek (2018); and Shorrer and Sóvágó (2018).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Correlation Neglect in Student-to-School Matching

Shorrer

Tergiman

2020

Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

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We present results from experiments containing incentivized school-choice scenarios. In these scenarios, we vary whether schools' assessments of students are based on a common priority (inducing correlation in admissions decisions) or are based on independent assessments (eliminating correlation in admissions decisions). The quality of students' application strategies declines in the presence of correlated admissions: application strategies become substantially more aggressive and fail to include attractive "safety" options. We provide a battery of tests suggesting that this phenomenon is at least partially driven by correlation neglect, and we discuss implications for the design and deployment of student-to-school matching mechanisms.

show abstract

Mechanism performance under strategy advice and sub-optimal play: A school choice experiment

Cited by 4 publications

References 14 publications

Correlation Neglect in Student-to-School Matching

Correlation Neglect in Student-to-School Matching

Correlation Neglect in Student-to-School Matching

Correlation Neglect in Student-to-School Matching

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