Memory, autonoetic consciousness, and the self

Markowitsch, Hans J.; Staniloiu, Angelica

doi:10.1016/j.concog.2010.09.005

Cited by 128 publications

(97 citation statements)

References 272 publications

(295 reference statements)

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“…Autobiografische Erinnerungen werden vorrangig in limbischen und dienzephalen Strukturen gebildet und gespeichert. Die Integration von emotionalen Informationen in einem speziellen Selbstbezug mit den Elementen einer subjektiven Zeitdimension, eines autonoetischen Bewusstseins und eines speziellen Selbsterlebens unterstreicht aber auch eine notwendige Beteiligung präfrontaler Strukturen, vor allem des orbitofrontalen Kortex [16,24,68,78,81].…”

Section: Organisation Der Gedächtnissystemeunclassified

Psychologische Störungen des autobiografischen Gedächtnisses – Einflüsse von Trauma, Dissoziation und PTSD

Kapfhammer

2011

psychiatr. psychother.

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Intact neuropsychological and neurobiological memory systems are precondition to any coherence and continuity of self structure during biography. Autobiographical memory is the ontogenetically most recent and most highly structured part of the episodic memory together with the semantic memory comprising the declarative or explicit memory that again has to be differentiated from various subsystems of the implicit memory. Autobiographical memory is paradigmatically impaired in dissociative disorders. A survey on epidemiological, clinical, course of illness-related, and etiopathogenetic characteristics of dissociative amnesia is given. A broad differential diagnosis has to be taken into account. As the clinical concept of dissociation is considered first and foremost within a context of trauma, the relation of trauma and memory in general, of PTSD and trauma memory in special is outlined.Zusammenfassung: Funktionstüchtige neuropsychologische und neurobiologische Gedächtnissysteme sind die Voraussetzung für die Kohärenz und Kontinuität einer Selbststruktur in der biographischen Entwicklung. Das autobiographische Gedächtnis ist die ontogenetisch jüngste und strukturell höchste Stufe des episodischen Gedächtnisses, das zusammen mit dem semantischen Gedächtnis das explizite oder deklarative Gedächtnis umfasst und von mehreren Subsystemen des impliziten Gedächtnisses unterschieden wird. Das autobiographische Gedächtnis ist speziell in dissoziativen Störungen beeinträchtigt. Die dissoziative Amnesie wird epidemiologisch, klinisch, verlaufsorientiert und ätiopathogene-tisch dargestellt. Eine breite Differenzialdiagnose gegenüber anderen psychischen, neurologischen und internistischen Störungen ist vorzunehmen. Da der klinische Dissoziationsbegriff stark in einen traumatologischen Bedingungskontext gestellt wird, schließt sich eine Darstellung des Zusammenhangs von Trauma und traumatischer Erinnerung im Allgemeinen und PTSD und Traumagedächtnis im Speziellen an.

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Section: Organisation Der Gedächtnissystemeunclassified

Psychologische Störungen des autobiografischen Gedächtnisses – Einflüsse von Trauma, Dissoziation und PTSD

Kapfhammer

2011

psychiatr. psychother.

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“…In this regard it has proven quite successful (e.g., Markowitsch and Staniliou 2011;Vandekerckhove and Panksepp 2009;Tulving 2005). It was not, however, intended to address questions of functionality: Accordingly, the adaptive benefits of episodic recollection remain unresolved.…”

Section: So What Is the Functional Significance Of Episodic Recollecmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Episodic recollection thus occupies a unique position among types of memory with regard to its experienced connection to the past (e.g., Klein 2013aKlein , 2013bMarkowitsch and Staniliou 2011;Tulving 1985Tulving , 2005: By virtue of autonoesis, it goes beyond the content presented, endowing the act of recollection with a direct, pre-reflective, and unmediated sense that one is re-living experiences of one's past. No additional mental gymnastics are required.…”

Section: The Special Case Of Episodic Recollectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Autonoesis and Belief in a Personal Past: An Evolutionary Theory of Episodic Memory Indices

Klein

2014

Rev.Phil.Psych.

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In this paper I discuss philosophical and psychological treatments of the question "how do we decide that an occurrent mental state is a memory and not, say a thought or imagination?" This issue has proven notoriously difficult to resolve, with most proposed indices, criteria and heuristics failing to achieve consensus. Part of the difficulty, I argue, is that the indices and analytic solutions thus far offered seldom have been situated within a well-specified theory of memory function. As I hope to show, when such an approach is adopted, not only does a new, functionally-grounded answer emerge; we also gain insight into the adaptive significance of the process proposed to underwrite our belief in the memorial status of a mental state (i.e., autonoetic awareness).What justifies our feeling that the content of awareness refers to the past? How do we determine that our phenomenology is a veridical (or even partly compromised) representation of our past and not, say, a thought or act of imagination? Such questions have vexed philosophers and psychologists for almost as long as attention has been directed toward the (uniquely human; e.g., Suddendorf and Corballis 2007; Tulving 2005) act of recollection.

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“…In contrast to WWW memory, true episodic memory involves a distinctive phenomenology, autonoetic consciousness-the agent does not merely retrieve a representation of the event, but again has the subjective sense of experiencing it (Markowitsch & Staniloiu, 2010;Nyberg, Kim, Habib, Levine, & Tulving, 2010;Tulving, 1983;Vandekerckhove & Panksepp, 2009). 8 Semantic memory, in contrast, can be defined as memory for facts in general (as opposed to experienced episodes) and does not involve this sort of phenomenology.…”

Section: Mental Time Travelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is external memory memory? Biological memory and extended mind

Michaelian

2012

Consciousness and Cognition

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a b s t r a c t Clark and Chalmers (1998) claim that an external resource satisfying the following criteria counts as a memory: (1) the agent has constant access to the resource; (2) the information in the resource is directly available; (3) retrieved information is automatically endorsed; (4) information is stored as a consequence of past endorsement. Research on forgetting and metamemory shows that most of these criteria are not satisfied by biological memory, so they are inadequate. More psychologically realistic criteria generate a similar classification of standard putative external memories, but the criteria still do not capture the function of memory. An adequate account of memory function, compatible with its evolution and its roles in prospection and imagination, suggests that external memory performs a function not performed by biological memory systems. External memory is thus not memory. This has implications for: extended mind theorizing, ecological validity of memory research, the causal theory of memory.

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Memory, autonoetic consciousness, and the self

Cited by 128 publications

References 272 publications

Psychologische Störungen des autobiografischen Gedächtnisses – Einflüsse von Trauma, Dissoziation und PTSD

Psychologische Störungen des autobiografischen Gedächtnisses – Einflüsse von Trauma, Dissoziation und PTSD

Autonoesis and Belief in a Personal Past: An Evolutionary Theory of Episodic Memory Indices

Is external memory memory? Biological memory and extended mind

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