Metaethics and the conceptual ethics of normativity

Abstract

This paper argues for the value of distinguishing two projects concerning our normative and evaluative thought and talk, which we dub "metanormative inquiry" and "the conceptual ethics of normativity" respectively. The first half of the paper offers a substantive account of each project and of the relationship between them. Roughly, metanormative inquiry aims to understand actual normative and evaluative thought and talk, and what (if anything) it is distinctively about, while the conceptual ethics of normativity engages in normative or evaluative reflection on normative and evaluative thought and talk. We explore how certain theories of content determination complicate the distinction between these projects, but argue that both the distinction and its significance survive these complications. The second half of the paper argues that attention to the distinction between these projects can promote progress in both projects in three ways. First, it can transform our understanding and evaluation of views that are routinely classified as part of "metaethics". Second, it can help us to identify important theoretical options that otherwise tend to remain obscure. And, third, it can help us to avoid tempting but fallacious arguments which can easily arise if the projects are not distinguished.

Conceptual ethics, metaepistemology, and normative epistemology

“…The account we develop here draws on the account we develop for the conceptual ethics of ethics (as well as for the conceptual ethics of normativity more generally) in(McPherson and Plunkett 2021).29 One's views on this question will depend, in part, on which sorts of entities one countenances in one's theory of thought and talk, and what work those entities play in that theory. For example, some philosophers are skeptical that work in conceptual ethics (or connected work in conceptual engineering, which we will discuss below) really is about concepts as such.…”