Metaphysical Explanation by Constraint

Bertrand, Michael

doi:10.1007/s10670-018-0009-5

Cited by 9 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 44 publications

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“…In this view, a MENP provides a so-called metaphysical 'explanation by constraint' of an empirical fact. 6 Metaphysical explanations by constraint are defined as explanations that explain their targets by showing that they must be the case, since the explanans is more necessary than the explanandum (Bertrand, 2018). MENP are explanations of this kind, since MENP are such that, "given some set of conditions A, then the connection between explanandum and explanans is mathematical in character, such that the resulting explanation involves a modal force stronger than that of causal generalizations" (Andersen, 2018, p. 494).…”

Section: Mathematical Explanations Of Natural Phenomenamentioning

confidence: 99%

Mathematical Explanations in Evolutionary Biology or Naturalism? A Challenge for the Statisticalist

Sterpetti

2021

Found Sci

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This article presents a challenge that those philosophers who deny the causal interpretation of explanations provided by population genetics might have to address. Indeed, some philosophers, known as statisticalists, claim that the concept of natural selection is statistical in character and cannot be construed in causal terms. On the contrary, other philosophers, known as causalists, argue against the statistical view and support the causal interpretation of natural selection. The problem I am concerned with here arises for the statisticalists because the debate on the nature of natural selection intersects the debate on whether mathematical explanations of empirical facts are genuine scientific explanations. I argue that if the explanations provided by population genetics are regarded by the statisticalists as non-causal explanations of that kind, then statisticalism risks being incompatible with a naturalist stance. The statisticalist faces a dilemma: either she maintains statisticalism but has to renounce naturalism; or she maintains naturalism but has to content herself with an account of the explanations provided by population genetics that she deems unsatisfactory. This challenge is relevant to the statisticalists because many of them see themselves as naturalists.

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Section: Mathematical Explanations Of Natural Phenomenamentioning

confidence: 99%

Mathematical Explanations in Evolutionary Biology or Naturalism? A Challenge for the Statisticalist

Sterpetti

2021

Found Sci

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“…In addition to making up the core of what x is, parts of its nature play a constraining role by restricting the way x or its counterparts might be across the possible worlds in which it obtains. It is because they play this constraining role that the constraints on x can be used for a metaphysical explanation of facts about it or about the world more generally (see Bertrand, forthcoming: 9–12).…”

Section: Metaphysical Constraints and The Argument From Absence Of Anmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…And constraints can be used to explain nearby facts about the instantiation behavior of the composition relation as well. These explanations do not even have the appearance of circularity (see Bertrand, forthcoming: 12–14).…”

Section: Metaphysical Constraints and The Argument From Absence Of Anmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…But metaphysical constraints and their objects need not stand in generative relations to one another: entities seem not to be generated by what it is to be them. Metaphysical constraints also function differently in explanatory contexts and back different sorts of explanation (Bertrand, forthcoming: 9–12).…”

Section: Metaphysical Constraints and The Argument From Absence Of Anmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…While this opens another path by which nonreductive views can be developed, the result is a sort of robust primitivism (the topic of section 2.3). Nonreductive grounding need not support deep explanatory characterization because identifying the nonreductive grounds of some entity x need not involve explaining what it is to be x (Bertrand, forthcoming: 9–12).…”

Section: What Are Reductionism and Primitivism Anyway?mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Metaphysical Constraints, Primitivism, and Reduction

Bertrand¹

2019

J. of the Am. Philos. Assoc.

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The argument from absence of analysis (AAA) infers primitivism about some x from the absence of a reductive analysis of x. But philosophers use the word ‘primitive’ to mean many distinct things. I argue that there is a robust sense of ‘primitive’ present in the metaphysics literature that cannot be inferred via the AAA. Successfully demonstrating robust primitivism about some x requires showing two things at once: that a reduction of x is not possible and that an explanatorily deep characterization of x is not available. In order to secure this second explanatory claim, the AAA must wrongly assume that reductive analysis is our only source of explanatory characterization. I argue that this is false by offering a distinct way of providing explanatory characterizations backed by suitably understood metaphysical constraints. While there remains a minimal sense of ‘primitive’ inferable via the AAA, this sense is exhausted by the denial of reduction. With minimal primitivism as its target, the AAA is uninteresting.

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We Need Non-factive Metaphysical Explanation

Bertrand

2020

Erkenn

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Suppose that A explains B. Do A and B need to be true? Provided that we have metaphysical explanation in mind, orthodoxy answers "yes:" metaphysical explanation is factive. This article introduces and defends a non-factive notion of metaphysical explanation. I argue that we need a non-factive notion of explanation in order to make sense of explanationist arguments where we motivate a view by claiming that it offers better explanations than its competitors. After presenting and rejecting some initially plausible rivals, I account for non-factive metaphysical explanation by drawing on existing applications of structural equation models to metaphysical grounding.

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Metaphysical Explanation by Constraint

Cited by 9 publications

References 44 publications

Mathematical Explanations in Evolutionary Biology or Naturalism? A Challenge for the Statisticalist

Mathematical Explanations in Evolutionary Biology or Naturalism? A Challenge for the Statisticalist

Metaphysical Constraints, Primitivism, and Reduction

We Need Non-factive Metaphysical Explanation

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