Miscarriage and Person‐Denying

Porter, Lindsey

doi:10.1111/josp.12086

Cited by 10 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…Interestingly, others have thought that the pain of miscarriage actually supports a pro-life position-if abortion is morally neutral, it is difficult to explain why miscarriage is a tragedy. See Harman (1999), Stoyles (2015), and Porter (2015).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Children, Fetuses, and the Non-Existent: Moral Obligations and the Beginning of Life

Jackson

2021

The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine

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The morality of abortion is a longstanding controversy. One may wonder whether it is even possible to make significant progress on an issue over which so much ink has already been spilled and there is such polarizing disagreement (Boyle, 1994, The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 19:183–200). The papers in this issue show that this progress is possible—there is more to be said about abortion and other crucial beginning-of-life issues. They do so largely by applying contemporary philosophical tools to moral questions involving life’s beginning. The first two papers defend the pro-life view from recent objections involving miscarriage and abortion doctors. The third shows how the social model of disability and the concept of transformative experience apply to classic debates like abortion and euthanasia. The final two papers address how rights and harms apply to children and to beings that do not yet exist. All five papers make a noteworthy contribution to the moral issues that arise at the beginning of life.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Children, Fetuses, and the Non-Existent: Moral Obligations and the Beginning of Life

Jackson

2021

The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine

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“…Especially for pregnant persons (and their partners) who struggle to conceive, but even for those whose pregnancy was unplanned but welcomed, miscarriages can be devastating. Some expecting parents mourn the loss of their fetus as they might the loss of a child (Klier, Geller, and Ritsher 2002;Porter 2015). 13 On the AFP, a person's grief at the loss of an early fetus is inappropriate or unwarranted because the lost fetus was not an object of value.…”

Section: The Actual Future Principle and Miscarriagesmentioning

confidence: 99%

It’s Complicated: What Our Attitudes toward Pregnancy, Abortion, and Miscarriage Tell Us about the Moral Status of Early Fetuses

Chambers

2020

Can. J. of Philosophy

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Many accounts of the morality of abortion assume that early fetuses must all have or lack moral status in virtue of developmental features that they share. Our actual attitudes toward early fetuses don’t reflect this all-or-nothing assumption. If we start with the assumption that our attitudes toward fetuses are accurately tracking their value, then we need an account of fetal moral status that can explain why it is appropriate to love some fetuses but not others. I argue that a fetus can come to have moral claims on persons who have taken up the activity of person-creation.

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“…One could also claim that Schrödinger's Fetus does not explain why prospective parents grieve when they lose their unborn child by miscarriage. Thus grief, as some have argued (Porter 2015), tells against person-denying arguments for the permissibility of abortion.…”

Section: The Objections and Repliesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Schrödinger’s Fetus

Räsänen

2019

Med Health Care and Philos

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This paper defends and develops Elizabeth Harman's Actual Future Principle with a concept called Schrödinger's Fetus. I argue that all early fetuses are Schrödinger's fetuses: those early fetuses that survive and become conscious beings have full moral status already as early fetuses, but those fetuses that die as early fetuses lack moral status. With Schrödinger's Fetus, it becomes possible to accept two widely held but contradictory intuitions to be true, and to avoid certain reductiones ad absurdum that pro-life and pro-choice positions face. It also gives a simple solution to the problem of prenatal harm.

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Miscarriage and Person‐Denying

Cited by 10 publications

References 3 publications

Children, Fetuses, and the Non-Existent: Moral Obligations and the Beginning of Life

Children, Fetuses, and the Non-Existent: Moral Obligations and the Beginning of Life

It’s Complicated: What Our Attitudes toward Pregnancy, Abortion, and Miscarriage Tell Us about the Moral Status of Early Fetuses

Schrödinger’s Fetus

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