Mitigating content poisoning attacks in named data networking: a survey of recent solutions, limitations, challenges and future research directions

Abstract

Named Data Networking (NDN) is one of the capable applicants for the future Internet architecture, where communications focus on content rather than providing content. NDN implements Information-Centric Networking (ICN) with its unique node structure and significant characteristics such as built-in mobility support, multicast support, and efficient content distribution to end-users. It has several key features, including inherent security, that protect the content rather than the communication channel. Despite the good features that NDN provides, it is nonetheless vulnerable to a variety of attacks, the most critical of them is the Content Poisoning Attack (CPA). In this survey, the existing solutions presented for the prevention of CPA in the NDN paradigm have been critically analyzed. Furthermore, we also compared the suggested schemes based on latency, communication overhead, and security. In addition, we have also shown the possibility of other possible NDN attacks on the suggested schemes. Finally, we adds some open research challanges.