Model diversity and the embarrassment of riches

Veit, Walter

doi:10.1080/1350178x.2021.1898660

Cited by 9 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 48 publications

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“…Chapter 4 further explores the issue of 'model diversity' (a term used by Rodrick 2015). In contrast to the accounts of Aydinonat (2018) and Veit (2020Veit ( , 2021, I argue that economic model diversity doesn't entail model pluralism. Using a microfoundationalist example, I illustrate one of the methodological virtues of model diversity not found in model pluralism.…”

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confidence: 57%

“…Model diversity, therefore, secures better economic explanations (Aydinonat 2018). Veit (2020Veit ( , 2021 dubs model pluralism 4 the practice that for any scientific goal z scientists require multiple models of aspect x of phenomenon y. Contrary to these, I take model diversity to not entail epistemic completeness (for instance, read Morrison 2011), at least not necessarily.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Methodology and Microfoundations

Ruiz

2022

EJPE

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Although microeconomics and macroeconomics differ in their object of study-microeconomics studies how economic individual agents make decisions and how those decisions interact, while macroeconomics studies the fluctuations of the economy as a whole-there is a significant tradition in economics that argues that macroeconomic models to be seen as epistemically compelling need to be given microfoundations. That is, 'macro' aggregates need to be shown to be derivable from the choice patterns of individual economic agents.This dissertation focuses on arguments that take macroeconomic and microeconomic entities' respective ontological natures as the reason why macroeconomics cannot be fully microfounded (

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confidence: 57%

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confidence: 99%

Methodology and Microfoundations

Ruiz

2022

EJPE

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“…This way of thinking is tempting, but it may well be misleading. To develop a compelling theory is to create a plethora of models that stand to each other in various robust and mutually illuminating relationships, which is precisely how we deal with the underdetermination of theories (see Veit 2021).…”

Section: On Strictly Speaking False Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Importantly, the result of this procedure is not to discard 'lower performing' or 'more inaccurate' variations out of hand. Rather, it is a continuously ongoing procedure (with no definite end result) of actively trying to find models that jointly illuminate highly complex real-world relations instead of trying to find one general model that captures everything, with modelling being more like a craft than a rule-based procedure (see Veit 2021;and see Cartwright 2019).…”

Section: Under(deter)mining the Tragedy Of The Commonsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Theory Roulette: Choosing that Climate Change is not a Tragedy of the Commons

Ortmann¹,

Veit²

2023

Environmental Values

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Climate change mitigation has become a paradigm case both for externalities in general and for the game-theoretic model of the Tragedy of the Commons (ToC) in particular. This situation is worrying, as we have reasons to suspect that some models in the social sciences are apt to be performative to the extent that they can become self-fulfilling prophecies. Framing climate change mitigation as a hardly solvable coordination problem may force us into a worse situation, by changing real-world behaviour to fit our model, rather than the other way around. But while this problem of the performativity of the ToC has been noted in a recent paper in this journal by Matthew Kopec, his proposed strategies for dealing with their self-fulfilling nature fall short of providing an adequate solution. Instead of relying on the idea that modelling assumptions are always strictly speaking false, this paper shows that the problem may be better framed as a problem of underdetermination between competing explanations. Our goal here is to provide a framework for choosing between this set of competing models that allows us to avoid a ‘Russian Roulette’-like situation in which we gamble with existential risk.

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“…As philosophers of science (and in particular, philosophers of the social sciences) have long recognized, complex phenomena are not to be understood through the competition of various methods with the aim of finding the ideal one, but rather through use of a broad range of tools that complement each other in various ways (Mitchell, 2009;Veit, 2019Veit, , 2021Wimsatt, 2007;Ylikoski & Aydinonat, 2014). Although there are often conflicts within scientific disciplines regarding what sets of methods, models, experiments, and the like should be employed, these often appear to be driven by "indoctrination" into the methodology of a lab and ideological disputes over the correct methods.…”

Section: Sahotra Sarkarmentioning

confidence: 99%

Challenging the utility of polygenic scores for social science: Environmental confounding, downward causation, and unknown biology

Burt

2022

Behav Brain Sci

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The sociogenomics revolution is upon us, we are told. Whether revolutionary or not, sociogenomics is poised to flourish given the ease of incorporating polygenic scores (or PGSs) as ‘genetic propensities’ for complex traits into social science research. Pointing to evidence of ubiquitous heritability and the accessibility of genetic data, scholars have argued that social scientists not only have an opportunity but a duty to add PGSs to social science research. Social science research that ignores genetics is, some proponents argue, at best partial and likely scientifically flawed, misleading, and wasteful. Here, I challenge arguments about the value of genetics for social science and with it the claimed necessity of incorporating PGSs into social science models as measures of genetic influences. In so doing, I discuss the impracticability of distinguishing genetic influences from environmental influences due to non-causal gene-environment correlations, especially population stratification, familial confounding, and downward causation. I explain how environmental effects masquerade as genetic influences in PGSs, which undermines their raison d’être as measures of genetic propensity, especially for complex socially contingent behaviors that are the subject of sociogenomics. Additionally, I draw attention to the partial, unknown biology, while highlighting the persistence of an implicit, unavoidable reductionist genes versus environments approach. I argue that leaving sociopolitical and ethical concerns aside, the potential scientific rewards of adding PGSs to social science are few and greatly overstated and the scientific costs, which include obscuring structural disadvantages and cultural influences, outweigh these meager benefits for most social science applications.

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Model diversity and the embarrassment of riches

Abstract: In a recent special issue dedicated to the work of Dani Rodrik, Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni [(2018). Modeling model selection in model pluralism.

Cited by 9 publications

References 48 publications

Methodology and Microfoundations

Methodology and Microfoundations

Theory Roulette: Choosing that Climate Change is not a Tragedy of the Commons

Challenging the utility of polygenic scores for social science: Environmental confounding, downward causation, and unknown biology

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