Modeling institutional change in transition economies

Abstract

A particular aspect of path dependence and change is discussed here. To understand institutional change in transition economies, a game theoretic model that combines economic changes with changes in the social values system is proposed, in a mechanism where the two changes are interdependent and influence one another in a repeated game. The speed of change in this dynamic model is the result of two rates, the ‘‘learning rate’’, how fast agents are learning to play the new ‘‘capitalist’’ game and the so-called ‘‘going-over rate’’, the mix in every time period of economic agents playing according to the ‘‘old’’ communist values and those playing according to the ‘‘new’’ capitalist values.

Zróżnicowanie ścieżek transformacji krajów Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej z perspektywy współczesnych teorii ekonomicznych

“…Rozwiązania sprzeczne z właś-ciwym dla danego społeczeństwa wzorcem cywilizacyjnym zostaną przez nie albo zmodyfikowane, albo odrzucone [Zukowski, 2005;Zweynert, Goldschmidt, 2006]. Do wprowadzenia obcych kulturowo instytucji może dojść jedynie wówczas, gdy zostaną one narzucone danemu społeczeństwu siłą i naciski te będą się utrzymywać przez bardzo długi czas (długi na tyle, aby doszło do modyfikacji wzorców przekazywanych kolejnym pokoleniom jako dziedzictwo kulturowe), [Kyriazis, Zouboulakis, 2005].…”

Is tax competition harmful and is the EU an optimal tax area?

“…Thus, "tax culture", as culture in general show strong path dependence or lock-in. It takes a long time and effort to change norms and customs, as the recent experience of ex-communist countries indicate (Kyriazis and Zouboulakis, 2005). "Tax culture" in particular shows the citizens attitude towards fiscal administration, varying from "trust" to "mistrust".…”

What is wrong with job security?

“…Motivation and employee attitudes in the former Soviet Union remain understudied, and sparse scholarship usually limits itself to analysis at the organizational level (Liebert, ; Rinnert, ). The Soviet Union, by virtue of its ideological underpinning, espoused collectivism, and selflessness as core bureaucratic values (Kyriazis & Zouboulakis, ). Communism did not tolerate self‐interested behavior; hence, prestige and high pay were unheard of with reference to public service.…”